MQDSS specifications by Chen, M.-S. et al.























Version 2.1 April 2020

Introduction
This document is a detailed specification of the design and security arguments of the
digital signature scheme MQDSS. It is divided in two main parts:
• Part I Backbone results - contains:
– an analysis of the hardness of the underlying hard problem with respect to both
classical and quantum algorithms - Chapter 2,
– a description of the underlying Identification scheme - Chapter 3,
– a description and proof of security of the underlying construction - Chapter 5.
• Part II MQDSS Specifications - contains:
– a detailed description of MQDSS - Chapter 7 and Chapter 9,
– proposed and additional parameter sets - Chapter 8,
– security analysis of MQDSS - Chapter 10,
– justification of the design choices - Chapter 11,
– a detailed performance analysis of the reference implementation using the proposed
parameter sets - Chapter 12.
– a discussion on the security vs performance tradeoffs - Chapter 13,
– a summary of the strengths and weaknesses - Chapter 14, and
– a short description of the optimized AVX2 implementation - Chapter 15.
New in Version 2.1
The parameter sets are updated to reflect the changes made to the number of rounds r
as a result of an attack against MQDSS by Kales and Zaverucha posted on the NIST
PQC forum [39] (see Chapter 5 for definition of the parameter, and Chapter 8 for the new
calculation of the parameter). In particular, the necessary number of rounds is ≈ 1.4 the
number of rounds given in Version 2.0.
A consequence of the update is that for all security levels, the signature size is ≈ 1.4
the signature size presented in Version 2.0. The size of the public and private key remains
the same as in Version 2.0.
We include the results of Don, Fehr and Majenz [25] who recently proved the security
of the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transform. A consequence of their result is that MQDSS
is provably secure in the QROM. For details see Chapter 5 and Chapter 10.
New in Version 2.0
Changes were made to the commitment functions. In particular the commitment functions
now take an additional argument - a random string of length 2k. The reason for this change
is that with this additional input it can be shown that the commitment function used in
MQDSS is computationally hiding - a propery needed to show the EU-CMA security of
MQDSS. We use a recent result from [46].
We have updated the algorithms for key generation, signing and verification accordingly
to reflect this change (see Chapter 7 and Chapter 9 for details). We have also updated the
security analysis (see Chapter 10 and Appendix A). Note that the size of the signature
for all parameter sets is bigger than in Version 1.1, but still significantly smaller than the
signature sizes from the NIST submission, i.e., Version 1.0.
Furthermore, a more accurate analysis for the best classical attacks against the MQ
problem was done, and the estimated classical complexity is now given in terms of gates.
New in Version 1.1
The parameter sets are updated to reflect the changes made to the number of rounds
r (see Chapter 5 for definition of the parameter, and Chapter 8 for the calculation of
the parameter). In particular, the necessary number of rounds is half of the one given in
Version 1.0. This has been corrected in Version 1.1.
A consequence of the update is that for all security levels, the signature size is approx-
imately half of the one presented in Version 1.0.
Note that further, as a result of the new way the parameters are determined, there is
also a reduction in size of the public and the secret keys (See Chapter 8 for details, and
compare to the same chapter in Version 1.0).
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1.1 Notations and Conventions
Let A(·, ·, . . . ) be a randomized algorithm. We write y ← A(x1, x2, . . . ) for the output of
the algorithm on input x1, x2, . . . . The same notation is used for the output of a function.
If S is a set, then s←R S denotes that s is drawn uniformly at random from S.
Furthermore, let Fq denote the finite field of order q. We use boldface letters u to denote
vectors over a finite field, i.e. u ∈ Fnq , for some positive integer n ∈ N. We call a function
Fnq → Fmq a vectorial function.
1.2 Security Notions and Definitions
In the following we provide basic security related definitions used throughout these speci-
fications.
A function µ is called negligible (in k) if for every positive polynomial p, and sufficiently
large k it holds that µ(k) < 1/p(k). For better readability we sometimes denote negligible
functions by negl(k).
We say that two distribution ensembles {Xk}k∈N and {Yk}k∈N indexed by a security
parameter k are computationally indistinguishable if for any non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A
|Pr [1← A (Xk)]− Pr [1← A (Yk)]| = negl(k) .
1.2.1 Digital Signatures
This specification describes a construction of digital-signature schemes. These are defined
as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Digital signature scheme). A digital-signature scheme with secu-
rity parameter k, denoted Dss(1k) is a triplet of polynomial-time algorithms Dss =
(KGen, Sign,Vf) defined as follows:
• The key-generation algorithm KGen is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a key pair
(sk, pk).
• The signing algorithm Sign is a possibly probabilistic algorithm that on input a secret
key sk and a message M outputs a signature σ.
• The verification algorithm Vf is a deterministic algorithm that on input a public key
pk, a message M and a signature σ outputs a bit b, where b = 1 indicates that the
signature is accepted and b = 0 indicates a reject.
We write Dss instead of Dss(1k), whenever the security parameter k is clear from context
or irrelevant. For correctness of a Dss, we require that for all (sk, pk) ← KGen(), all mes-
sages M and all signatures σ ← Sign(sk,M), we get Vf(pk,M, σ) = 1, i.e., that correctly
generated signatures are accepted.
Existential Unforgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks.
The standard security notion for digital signature schemes is existential unforgeability




Let {(Mi)}Qs1 be the queries to Sign(sk, ·).
Return 1 iff Vf(pk,M?, σ?) = 1 and M? 6∈ {Mi}Qs1 .
For the success probability of an adversary A in the above experiment we write





A signature scheme is called EU-CMA-secure if any PPT algorithm A has only negligible
success probability in the Expeu-cmaDss(1k)(A) experiment. More formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 1.2 (EU-CMA security). Let k ∈ N and Dss a digital signature scheme with
security parameter k. We call Dss existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks
or EU-CMA-secure if for all Qs, t = poly(k) the success probability of any PPT algorithm A
(the adversary) running in time ≤ t, making at most Qs queries to Sign in the Expeu-cmaDss(1k)(A)
experiment, is negligible in k:
Succeu-cmaDss(1k) (A) = negl(k) .
In the security proof of our signature scheme, we will also make use of the weaker
notion of security against key-only attacks (KOA). The difference from EU-CMA security
is that the adversary is given no access to the signing oracle, i.e., Qs = 0. More formally,




Return 1 iff Vf(pk,M?, σ?) = 1.
Definition 1.3 (KOA security). Let k ∈ N and Dss a digital signature scheme with
security parameter k. We call Dss secure under key only attacks or KOA-secure if for all
t = poly(k) the success probability of any PPT adversary A running in time ≤ t in the
ExpkoaDss(1k)(A) experiment, is negligible in k:
SucckoaDss(1k) (A) = negl(k) ,







An identification scheme (IDS) is a protocol that allows a prover P to prove its identity
to a verifier V. More formally:
Definition 1.4 (Identification scheme). An identification scheme with security param-
eter k, denoted IDS(1k), is a triplet of PPT algorithms IDS = (KGen,P,V) such that:
• the key generation algorithm KGen outputs a key pair (sk, pk).
• P and V are interactive algorithms, executing a common protocol. The prover P takes
as input a secret key sk and the verifier V takes as input a public key pk. At the
conclusion of the protocol, V outputs a bit b with b = 1 indicating “accept” and b = 0
indicating “reject”.
We write IDS instead of IDS(1k), if the security parameter k is clear from context or
irrelevant. For correctness of an IDS, we require that for all (pk, sk)← KGen() we have
Pr [〈P(sk),V(pk)〉 = 1] = 1,
where 〈P(sk),V(pk)〉 refers to the common execution of the protocol between P with input
sk and V on input pk. In this case we say that the IDS is perfectly correct.
For the following definitions we need the notion of a transcript. A transcript of an
execution of an identification scheme IDS refers to all the messages exchanged between P
and V and is denoted by trans(〈P(sk),V(pk)〉).
We will focus on canonical 2n+ 1-pass IDS, where the prover and the verifier exchange
2n+ 1 messages, n challenges and n replies. These IDS are defined as follows.
Definition 1.5 (Canonical 2n + 1-pass identification schemes). Consider IDS =
(KGen,P,V), a 2n + 1-pass identification scheme with n challenge spaces C1, . . . , Cn.
We call IDS a canonical 2n + 1-pass identification scheme if the prover can be split
into n + 1 subroutines P = (P0,P1, . . . ,Pn) and the verifier into n + 1 subroutines
V = (ChS1, . . . ,ChSn,Vf) such that:
• P0(sk) computes the initial commitment com sent as the first message and a state state
fed forward to P1.
• ChS1, computes the first challenge message ch1 ←R C1, sampling at random from the
challenge space C1.
• P1(state, ch1), computes the first response resp1 of the prover (and updates the state
state) given access to the state and the first challenge.
• For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
– ChSi, computes the i-th challenge message chi ←R Ci.
– Pi(state, chi), computes the i-th response respi of the prover given access to the state
and the i-th challenge.
• Vf(pk, com, ch1, resp1, . . . , chn, respn), upon access to the public key and the whole tran-
script outputs V’s final decision.
Note that the state forwarded among the prover algorithms can contain all inputs to
previous prover algorithms if they are needed later. We also assume that the verifier keeps
all sent and received messages to feed them to Vf.
Our construction uses the special case of canonical 5-pass IDS (where n = 2). On the
other hand, standard choice in the literature for building signatures is the special case
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n = 1. For comparison, we will use both in these specifications, and for completeness
and clarity we provide figures of both. Figure 1.1 describes a canonical 3-pass IDS, and
Figure 1.2 a canonical 5-pass IDS.
P V
(state, com)← P0(sk) com
ch1 ←R ChS1(1k)ch1
resp1 ← P1(state, ch1) resp1
b← Vf(pk, com, ch1, resp1)
Fig. 1.1: Canonical 3-pass IDS
P V
(state, com)← P0(sk) com
ch1 ←R ChS1(1k)ch1
(state, resp1)← P1(state, ch1) resp1
ch2 ←R ChS2(1k)ch2
resp2 ← P2(state, ch2) resp2
b← Vf(pk, com, ch1, resp1, ch2, resp2)
Fig. 1.2: Canonical 5-pass IDS
Furthermore, we will consider a particular type of canonical 5-pass IDS where the size
of the two challenge spaces is restricted to q and 2.
Definition 1.6 (q2 -Identification scheme). A q2 -Identification scheme IDS is a canon-
ical 5-pass identification scheme where for the challenge spaces C1 and C2 it holds that
|C1| = q and |C2| = 2.
Security against Impersonation under Passive Attack.
The standard security notion for identification schemes is security against impersonation.
Here, the goal of the adversary - the impersonator I, is to impersonate the prover in an
interaction with an honest verifier without the knowledge of the secret key. When talking
about passive attacks, the impersonator, besides the public key, might have access to poly-
nomially many valid interactions between the prover and the verifier (via eavesdropping
for example), i.e., access to a transcript oracle Trans(pk, sk, ·) that outputs valid transcripts
of honest executions.






For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
chi ←R ChSi(1k)
(state, respi)← ITrans(pk,sk,·)(pk)
Return 1 iff Vf(pk, com, ch1, resp1, . . . , chn, respn) = 1.
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Definition 1.7 (IMP-PA security). Let k ∈ N and IDS a canonical 2n+ 1 identification
scheme with security parameter k. We say IDS is secure against impersonation under
passive attacks or IMP-PA-secure if for all Qt, t = poly(k) the success probability of any
PPT impersonator I running in time ≤ t, making at most Qt queries to Trans in the
Expimp-pa
IDS(1k)
(I) experiment, is negligible in k:
Succimp-pa
IDS(1k)
(I) = negl(k) .
Security Properties of Identification Schemes.
The properties of identification schemes interesting in our context are those that provide
passive security. We next give the necessary definitions.
First of all, it must be hard for any cryptographic scheme to derive a valid secret key
given a public key. To formally capture this intuition, we need to define what valid means.
For this we define the notion of a key relation.
Definition 1.8 (Key relation). Let IDS be an identification scheme and R some relation.
We say IDS has key relation R if
∀(pk, sk)← KGen() : (pk, sk) ∈ R
Now that we have defined what valid means, we can define key-one-wayness.
Definition 1.9 (Key-One-Wayness). Let k ∈ N be the security parameter, IDS(1k)
be an identification scheme with key relation R. We call IDS key-one-way (KOW) (with





(pk, sk)← KGen(), sk′ ← A(pk) : (pk, sk′) ∈ R
]
= negl(k)
Definition 1.10 (Soundness (with soundness error κ)). Let k ∈ N, IDS(1k) =
(KGen,P,V) an identification scheme with security parameter k. We say that IDS is sound,








≤ κ+ negl(k) .
Definition 1.11 ((computational) Honest-verifier zero-knowledge). Let k ∈ N,
IDS(1k) = (KGen, P,V) an identification scheme with security parameter k. We say that
IDS is computational honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) if there exists a probabilis-
tic polynomial time algorithm S, called the simulator, such that for any polynomial time




|Pr [1← A (sk, pk, trans(〈P(sk),V(pk)〉))]− Pr [1← A (sk, pk,S(pk))]| = negl(k) .
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Definition 1.12 (Special soundness). Let IDS(1k) be a 3-pass Identification scheme
with key relation R and A a polynomial time algorithm that upon input of security param-
eter 1k and an IDS(1k) public key pk outputs, with non-negligible probability, four valid
transcripts with respect to pk:
trans = (com, ch1, resp1),




where ch1 6= ch′1.
We say that IDS(1k) is special sound if there exists a polynomial time algorithm KIDS,
the extractor, that, given a public key pk and access to A, outputs a secret key sk such that
(pk, sk) ∈ R with non-negligible success probability in k.
To prove security of our signature scheme, we will make use of the existence of so called
q2-extractor which is a variant of special soundness. This is combined with a notion of
key-one-wayness to later be able to argue about security.
Definition 1.13 (q2-Extractor). Let IDS(1k) be a q2-Identification scheme with key re-
lation R and A a polynomial time algorithm that upon input of security parameter 1k and
an IDS(1k) public key pk outputs, with non-negligible probability, four valid transcripts with
respect to pk:
trans(1)= (com, ch1, resp1, ch2, resp2), trans
(3)= (com, ch′1, resp
′
1, ch2, resp2),













where ch1 6= ch′1 and ch2 6= ch′2.
We say that IDS(1k) has a q2-Extractor if there exists a polynomial time algorithm
KIDS, the extractor, that, given a public key pk and access to A, outputs a secret key sk
such that (pk, sk) ∈ R with non-negligible success probability in k.
Security Properties of Commitments.
The security of identification schemes relies on the properties of the underlying commit-
ment scheme. The goal of “committing” to a certain value is twofold: It should not be
feasible for anyone to discover this value before the prover opens the commitment, but
also, it should not be feasible for the prover to open the commitment in multiple ways.
These two properties are known as hiding and binding. They come in different flavors -
perfect, statistical and computational, depending on what “feasible” means.
For our purposes, the weakest version of computational hiding and binding will suffice.
These are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1.14 (Computationally hiding commitments). Let k ∈ N, Com(1k) a
commitment scheme with security parameter k. We say that Com is computationally hiding
if for any two messages M,M ′ and random string ρ, for any polynomial time algorithm
A: ∣∣Pr [1← A (Com(ρ,M))]− Pr [1← A (Com(ρ,M ′))]∣∣ = negl(k) .
Definition 1.15 (Computationally binding commitments). Let k ∈ N, Com(1k)
a commitment scheme with security parameter k. We say that Com is computationally
binding if for any polynomial time algorithm A
Pr
[






2.1 Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) Functions and the MQ Problem
Let m,n, q ∈ N, x = (x1, . . . , xn) and let MQ(n,m,Fq) denote the family of vectorial
functions F : Fnq → Fmq of degree 2 over Fq:











i xi, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
We will refer to F ∈ MQ(n,m,Fq) as multivariate quadratic (MQ) function. Given
v ∈ Fmq we will refer to F(x) = v as system of m quadratic equations in n variables.
We will omit m,n, q whenever they are clear from the context.
Definition 2.1. Let F ∈MQ(n,m,Fq). The function G(x,y) = F(x + y)−F(x)−F(y)
is called the polar form of the function F.
It is not hard to verify that the polar form is bilinear, i.e., for every a1,a2,b ∈ Fnq it holds
G(a1 + a2,b) = G(a1,b) + G(a2,b) and
G(b,a1 + a2) = G(b,a1) + G(b,a2).
Definition 2.2 (MQ relation). The MQ relation is the binary relation defined as:
RMQ(m,n,q) ⊆ (MQ(n,m,Fq)× Fmq )× Fnq : ((F,v), s) ∈ RMQ(m,n,q) iff F(s) = v.
We relate the following problem to the family MQ(n,m,Fq) of MQ functions:
Definition 2.3 (MQ problem (search version)). Let m,n, q ∈ N. An instance
MQ(F,v) of the MQ (search) problem is defined as:
Given F ∈MQ(n,m,Fq),v ∈ Fmq find, if any, s ∈ Fnq such that
((F,v), s) ∈ RMQ(m,n,q).
The decisional version of the MQ problem is known to be NP -complete [33]1. It is
widely believed that the MQ problem is intractable even for quantum computers in the
average case. We formalize the intractability of the MQ problem through the following.
1 Note that theMQ problem is a special case of the more general problem of solving a system of equations
over a finite field of degree deg ≥ 2, known as PoSSo. The decisional version of the PoSSo problem is
NP -complete [33].
Assumption 2.4 (MQ assumption) Let m,n, q ∈ N, F ←R MQ(n,m,Fq) and s ←R
Fnq . For every polynomial time quantum algorithm A given F and v = F(s) it is computa-
tionally hard to find a solution s′ to the MQ(F,v) problem. More formally,
Pr
((F,v), s′) ∈ RMQ(m,n,q) :
F←RMQ(n,m,Fq)
s←R Fnq
((F,v), s) ∈ RMQ(m,n,q)
s′ ← A(1k,F,v)
 = negl(k) .
2.2 Classical Algorithms for Solving the MQ Problem
The difficulty of solving the MQ problem is strongly dependent on the ratio between the
number of variables n and number of equations m. It is known that when m > n(n+ 1)/2
(overdetermined systems) and when n > m(m + 1) (underdetermined systems) the MQ
problem is solvable in polynomial time.
The first case is simply a result of replacing all monomials by a new variable, and
solving a linear system in n(n+1)/2 variables and at least as many equations. The second
case was solved by Kipnis, Patarin and Goubin [43] and later [57] Thomae and Wolf
showed that the complexity gradually increases to exponential when m ≈ n. Indeed, the
most interesting case is when m = n: Adding more equations gives away more information
about the system; On the other hand, if there are more variables, we can simply fix the
excess of them, and end up with a system of the same number of variables and equations.
In the rest of this section we will assume that m > n, but also that m = O(n).
For this range of parameters, the state of the art algorithms employ algebraic techniques
that analyze the properties of the ideal generated by the given polynomials. The most
important are the algorithms from the F4/F5 family [27, 28, 5, 12], and the variants of
the XL algorithm [20, 23, 63, 62]. Although different in description, the two families bear
many similarities, which results in similar complexity [64]. Therefore, in our analysis we
will not consider the algorithms from the XL family.
In the Boolean case, today’s state of the art algorithms BooleanSolve [7] and FXL [62]
provide improvement over exhaustive search with an asymptotic complexity of Θ(20.792n)
and Θ(20.875n) for m = n, respectively. Practically, the improvement is visible for poly-
nomials with more than 200 variables. A very recent algorithm, the Crossbred algorithm
[38] over F2, is likely to further improve the asymptotic complexity, as the authors report
that it passes the exhaustive search barrier already for 37 Boolean variables.
Interestingly, the current best known algorithms, BooleanSolve [7], FXL [62, 63], the
Crossbred algorithm [38] and the Hybrid approach [12] all combine algebraic techniques
with exhaustive search. This immediately allows for improvement in their quantum version
using Grover’s quantum search algorithm [37], provided the cost of implementing them on
a quantum computer does not diminish the gain from Grover. These algorithms will be
subject to our interest in the rest of the section. Their quantum version and the speed up
from using Grover’s algorithm will be discussed in Section 2.3.
For comparison reasons, in our analysis we will also consider exhaustive search per-
formed through fast enumeration techniques [13]. We will not consider a probabilistic
method recently proposed by Lokshtanov et al. [47]. Although it is provably faster than
exhaustive search, the improvement in the case of odd characteristic fields is not compa-
rable to the best algebraic methods. Furthermore, it has not been studied enough and has
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not been implemented (to the best of our knowledge), so even in the Boolean case where
the asymptotic complexity is O(20.8765n) it is not clear for what values of n this algorithm
outperforms exhaustive search.
In the rest of this section, let F = (f1, . . . , fm), fi ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn]. Without loss of
generality, the equation system that we want to solve is F(x) = 0.
2.2.1 Exhaustive search
A natural and simple way of obtaining a solution of the given system is to try out all






additions and multiplications for a single polynomial, and m times more for the entire
system, amounting to a complexity of O(mn2qn) field operations. However, in [13], Bouil-
laguet et al. introduced a technique for fast enumeration in F2 that needs only log2(n)2n+2
Boolean operations. The technique uses Gray codes enumeration and partial derivatives
of the polynomials. Although [13] considers only the Boolean case, the technique can be
extended to larger fields by using q-ary Gray codes. So, for simplicity we will assume that
fast enumeration can be performed in logq(n)q
n operations over a field of size q.
2.2.2 The HybridF5 algorithm
Currently, the standard algorithms for solving generic instances of the MQ problem are
the algorithms for computing a Gröbner basis of the ideal generated by the set of MQ
polynomials. The idea was first introduced by Buchberger [15] and later further devel-
oped by Lazard [45] who established the link between computing the Gröbner basis and
performing Gaussian elimination on the Macaulay matrices (of degree up to a sufficiently
large integer D) of the given polynomials.2 The algorithm was improved several times by
Buchberger himself in order to reduce the number of unnecessary reductions to 0 during
the Gröbner basis computation. A significant improvement was done in the variant pro-
posed by Faugère [27] known as the F4-algorithm. The main improvement comes from the
introduced strategy to reduce all critical pairs of minimal degree at once (instead of one
by one) using the Macaulay matrix and sparse matrix algebra techniques. Later, Faugère
completely removed the reductions to zero for semi-regular sequences in the improved
F5-algorithm [28, 8, 6].
The semi-regularity assumption is crucial in this algorithm (as it will be in the other
algebraic methods we consider). Informally (which is enough for our purposes), a sequence
of polynomials (f1, . . . , fm),m ≥ n is semi-regular if the only relations (dependencies)
among the polynomials are the trivial ones generated by fifj − fjfi = 0. Note that the
regularity assumption is a very plausible one for randomly generated polynomials, and
has been experimentally supported (see for example [7]). We will also assume that the
instances generated in our signature scheme are semi-regular.
The main complexity in the F5 algorithm (and also in the BooleanSolve and the
Crossbread algorithm) comes from performing Gauss elimination on the Macaulay matrix
MacD(F) of degree D (the matrix whose rows are formed by the coefficients of monomials
2 In essence, it can be considered as a generalization of Gaussian elimination for nonlinear polynomials.
One important distinction is that, unlike in Gaussian elimination, in Gröbner basis algorithms the order
in which the variables are eliminated and generally, the ordering of the monomials, is very important
(see [28, 8] for example).
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ufi of maximal degree D). The degree D should be big enough so that a Gröbner basis
of the ideal generated by the polynomials can be obtained by row-reducing the Macaulay
matrix. The smallest such D is called the degree of regularity Dreg, and for semi-regular














and the + subscript denotes that the series has been truncated before the first non-positive
coefficient.




















operations, where 2 6 ω 6 3 is the linear algebra constant. The computation is repeated
for every D ∈ {2, . . . , Dreg}. In the case of q = 2, the logic is the same, except that now
we use plain combinations (instead of combinations with repetition as for q > 2). In total,
the complexity of the F5 algorithm in field operations is:









)ω−1 , for q > 2, and










More compactly, the complexity of the F5 algorithm in field operations [6] is:




, for q > 2, and





The value of the linear algebra constant ω depends on the algorithm used, and it ranges
from ω = 3 for näıve Gauss elimination down to ω = 2.376 for Coppersmith-Winograd
algorithm [18], and even further to ω < 2.373 due to improvements by Vassilevska-Williams
[61]. However these algorithms are extremely complex and with a huge constant factor to
be actually useful in practice. For cryptanalysis purposes, the best we can hope for is
ω = log2(7), obtained using Strassen algorithm [55].
The Hybrid approach introduced by Bettale et al.[12], tries to reduce the complex-
ity of F5 by introducing a trade-off between brute-forcing and the F5 algorithm for
smaller MQ instances. Namely, the algorithms first fixes n − k variables, so the re-
duction is now performed on MacDreg(F̃), where F̃ = (f̃1, . . . , f̃m) and f̃i(x1, . . . , xk) =
fi(x1, . . . , xk, ak+1, . . . , an), for every (ak+1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn−k2 . The value of k is chosen such
that the overall complexity is minimized. In total the complexity of the Hybrid approach
for solving systems of n equations in n variables over Fq is
CHyb(n, k) = Guess(q, n− k) · CF5(q, k, n), (2.2)
where Guess(q, n − k) = O(log(n − k)qn−k) is the cost of the exhaustive search over all
qn−k possibilities, including partially evaluating n − k variables in field operations, and
CF5(k, n) is given in (2.1).
Note that the technique of fixing variables had already been used in the XL algorithm
[20], and this version is known as FXL [62, 63].
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2.2.3 The BooleanSolve algorithm
In the case of F2, the BooleanSolve algorithm [7] performs better than the Hybrid approach.
Similar to the Hybrid approach, it requires a semi-regularity assumption on the MQ
instance. Also as in the Hybrid approach, it first fixes some optimal amount n− k of the
variables and then performs some tests on the smaller instance.
Then, the problem of finding a solution is basically reduced to testing the consistency
of a related linear system
u ·MacDreg(F̃) = (0, . . . , 0, 1) (2.3)
where MacDreg(F̃) is defined in the previous paragraph. If the system (2.3) is consistent,
then the original system does not have a solution. This allows for pruning of all the
inconsistent branches corresponding to some a ∈ Fn−k2 . A simple exhaustive search is
then performed on the remaining branches. It can be shown that the running time of
the algorithm is dominated by the first part of the algorithm (this holds true even in
the quantum version of the algorithm, although in the quantum case the difference is
not as big, as a consequence of the reduced complexity of the first part). Therefore, for
simplicity, we omit the exhaustive search on the remaining branches from our analysis.
The complexity of the BooleanSolve algorithm is given by
CBool(n, k) = Guess(2, n− k) · Ccons(MacDreg(F̃)), (2.4)
where Guess(2, k) is defined the same as in the Hybrid approach, and
Ccons(MacDreg(F̃)) = Θ(N







is the complexity of testing consistency of the system (2.3), using the sparse linear algebra
algorithm from [34].
2.2.4 The Crossbread algorithm
Recently, Joux and Vitse [38] proposed a new algebraic method for solving quadratic sys-
tems over F2 called the Crossbred algorithm. Although originally only F2 was considered,
the algorithm works the same for any field, so we will assume an arbitrary field Fq. We
will also assume that the given system is semi-regular.
The main idea of this approach is to first perform some operations on the Macaulay
matrix of degree D > Dreg(k, n) of the given system, and only afterwards to fix variables.
Again, as in the previous algorithms, k is a suitably chosen optimization parameter such
that the overall complexity is minimized. Furthermore, let d 6 D be a small integer and
degku denote the degree of the monomial u in the first k variables. Let Mac
(k)
D,d(F) be the
submatrix of MacD(F) consisting of the rows indexed by ufi, where degku > d−1, and let
M
(k)
D,d(F) be the submatrix of Mac
(k)
D,d(F) consisting of the columns indexed by u, where
degku > d.
The algorithm works as follows: In the first part, we try to find enough linearly inde-







including the original m
when d > 1) in the kernel of M
(k)
D,d(F), that are not in the kernel of Mac
(k)
D,d(F). Next we
find the set of polynomials corresponding to viMac
(k)
D,d(F). These polynomials, (possibly
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together with the original when d > 1) form a new system P that will be of interest in
the second part of the algorithm.
In this part, for each (ak+1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn−kq we form the system P̃(x1, . . . , xk) =















when q = 2), which means
it is possible to solve it easily by linearization, i.e. by considering each monomial as new
variable, and solving the resulting linear system.
The advantage here comes from using sparse linear algebra algorithms on MacD(F) for
the first part and dense linear algebra only on the smaller matrix in the second part. Note
that, as long as the number of the remaining k variables is small, the sparse linear algebra
part takes much less time, since in this case Dreg(k, n) is also small. It turns out that
actually it is more efficient to work with a MacD, with D > Dreg(k, n), but not too large
so that the cost of the first part becomes significant. The complexity thus, is dominated
by enumeration of n−k variables in a system of n variables of degree D over Fq q > 2, and














the complexity of the Crossbread algorithm for q > 2 is given by3
CCross(n, k, d) = Sparse(M
(k)
D,d(F)) +Guess(q, n− k) ·
(












) is the complexity for finding the kernel vectors using for example the block
Lanczos algorithm [48] or the block Wiedemann algorithm [19] for sparse matrices (or
their improvements). Note that an external specialization of variables is also possible, but
we have verified that this does not bring any improvement in the number of operations.
However it is useful for parallelization of the algorithm. 4
At the end of this section, we provide the complexity of the described algorithms for
solvingMQ instances for various fields Fq and different values ofm = n that are interesting
for practical use. Table 2.1 summarizes the Boolean case, and Table 2.2 lists the values
for some common choices of q > 2. The cost of the algorithms is given in gate count5 as
suggested in the NIST call for proposals [50]. In this transformation from field operations
to gate count, we have assumed that a field multiplication costs 2 dlog2 qe
2 gates and a
field addition costs dlog2 qe gates.






4 The preprint [38] does not contain a complexity analysis of the Crossbread algorithm, nor are all the
choices in the algorithm described. What is written here is our interpretation of the algorithm.
5 In Version 1 of these specifications we used field operations for estimating the classical complexity of
the algorithms.
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CrossBread (d=1) BooleanSolve HybridF5 FastEnum
n k Gates k Gates k Gates Gates
128 28 2119 40 2137 16 2139 2134
144 32 2132 52 2151 17 2155 2150
160 30 2149 55 2165 18 2170 2166
192 31 2180 80 2193 35 2200 2199
224 32 2212 96 2220 38 2230 2231
256 33 2243 102 2248 55 2261 2263
296 34 2282 139 2282 59 2298 2303
Table 2.1: Comparison of the time complexity of the Crossbread algorithm [38], the
BooleanSolve algorithm [7], the Hybrid Approach [12] and exhaustive search through fast
enumeration [13] in terms of field operations for F2. The parameter k denotes the number
of remaining variables in the specialization process in each of the algorithms respectively.
HybridF5 CrossBread (d=1) FastEnum
q n k Gates k Gates Gates
4 80 32 2157 20 2139 2167
4 96 35 2185 21 2169 2199
4 112 44 2212 22 2200 2231
4 128 53 2240 23 2230 2263
4 144 51 2266 24 2260 2295
4 160 60 2293 25 2290 2327
16 48 36 2148 17 2144 2200
16 64 41 2191 19 2201 2264
16 72 49 2211 20 2229 2296
16 80 52 2233 20 2261 2328
16 96 66 2273 21 2321 2392
31 40 32 2136 17 2135 2206
31 48 39 2160 17 2174 2246
31 64 49 2206 19 2244 2325
31 72 53 2230 20 2279 2365
31 80 62 2253 20 2319 2404
31 88 71 2275 20 2359 2444
31 96 72 2298 21 2394 2484
32 48 39 2161 17 2176 2248
32 64 52 2207 19 2246 2328
32 72 53 2231 20 2282 2368
32 80 62 2253 20 2322 2408
32 88 71 2276 20 2362 2448
32 96 72 2299 21 2397 2488
64 40 32 2145 17 2159 2248
64 64 52 2220 19 2292 2392
128 40 37 2150 17 2183 2288
128 64 59 2230 19 2 2456
256 40 37 2153 17 2206 2328
Table 2.2: Comparison of the time complexity of the the Hybrid Approach [12], the
Crossbread algorithm [38], and exhaustive search through fast enumeration [13] in terms
of field operations for common choices of the field Fq, q > 2. The parameter k denotes
the number of remaining variables in the specialization process in each of the algorithms
respectively.
15
2.3 Using Grover’s Algorithm for Solving the MQ Problem
In this section we will investigate the cost of the quantum versions of the known classical
algorithms that we described in the previous Section. To the best of our knowledge, there
are no dedicated quantum algorithms for solving the MQ problem. We are only aware of
the work of Westerbaan and Schwabe [60], who investigate the cost of exhaustive search
using Grover’s algorithm against the MQ problem. In our paper [16], where we first
introduce MQDSS, we briefly analyze the gain of applying Grover on the Hybrid approach.
Here, we will use a more accurate metric, and following NIST’s recommendations [50]
we will express the cost of the algorithms in terms of number of fault-tolerant quantum
gates and quantum circuit depth.
2.3.1 Finite Field Arithmetic on Quantum Computers
Fault-Tolerant quantum gates.
In quantum computing, similarly as in classical computing, there is a need for fixed small
universal set of instructions that can be used to express any type of reversible quantum
operation. Furthermore, such universal sets need to have fault-tolerant implementations
to reduce pilling up of noise and thus errors in quantum computation. Recent work [4, 3]
has identified “Clifford+T” as the standard universal fault-tolerant gate set. It is the set
of gates generated by = {H,CNOT, T} where,




CNOT : |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|x⊕ y〉,
T : |x〉 7→ e
iπx
4 |x〉.
We will also need the Toffoli gate:
Toffoli : |x〉|y〉|z〉 7→ |x〉|y〉|z ⊕ xy〉.
which is also a common gate in designing circuits. Many implementations of the Toffoli
gate using Clifford+T gate are known, depending on whether the goal is to minimize the
number of ancilla qubits used, the gate count or circuit depth. In our evaluation we have
chosen a balanced metric, assuming sufficient number of ancilla qubits. In other words,
we are interested in implementations that minimize at the same time the T -count and T -
depth (of T gates only) but more importantly, the overall gate count and depth including
Clifford gates. Thus we will use the implementation from Amy et al.[4] that requires 7
T -gates and 8 Clifford gates, and has T -depth 4, and overall depth 8.
In what follows, we will use the same metric to evaluate larger quantum circuits.
Cost of finite field addition and multiplication.
The algorithms we are interested in, are all performed over finite fields F(2s) or Fp for p
prime. Therefore we need an estimate for the cost of the arithmetic operations over these
fields. We use the results from [9, 17, 40]:
• Addition over F(2s) can be implemented using s parallel CNOT (Clifford) gates (so
the overall depth is 1).
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• Multiplication over F(2s) (using Karatsuba’s algorithm) can be implemented using
7slog2(3) T -gates and 10slog2(3) − 2s Clifford gates, with T -depth of 4s and overall
depth of 9s
• Addition over F(p) can be implemented using approximately 180 log2(p) Clifford gates
and 140 log2(p) T -gates with the same depth.
• Multiplication over F(p) can be implemented using approximately 2·180 log22(p) Clifford
gates and 2 · 140 log22(p) T -gates with T -depth of 2 · 140 log2(p) and overall depth of
2 · 320 log2(p).
2.3.2 Grover’s Quantum Search Algorithm
Grover’s algorithm [37] searches for an item in an unordered list of sizeN = 2k that satisfies
a certain condition given in a form of a quantum black-box function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}
and realized as a unitary circuit Uf : |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|x⊕f(y)〉 - the “oracle”. If the condition
is satisfied for an item x0, then f(x0) = 1, otherwise f(x0) = 0. The algorithm consists of
applying an optimal number of times the operatorG = Uf
(
(H⊗k(2|0〉〈0| − 12k)H⊗k)⊗ 12
)
on a state |ψ〉⊗ |φ〉 where the first register has been prepared in an equal superposition of
all |x〉, i.e., |ψ〉 = 1√
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k |x〉, and φ =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) (see Figure 2.1). The operator







times, where M is the number of items that
satisfy the condition f [14]. In this case, if M << N , the algorithm fails with negligible
probability 6 M/N . Note that, even if the number of solutions M is unknown, a slight
modification of the algorithm from [14], again guarantees that a solution will be found







Grover iterations. In the next subsection,
we will elaborate on the number of solutions of the MQ problem.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2.1: Quantum circuit that implements Grover’s algorithm for a search space of size
N = 2k. Figure from [36]. (a) The full algorithm where G is the Grover iterate that
represents one round of the algorithm. (b) One round of Grover’s algorithm (detailed view
of the operator G).
From the above, and assuming we know the number of solutions, the cost of Grover’s








· (Cost(Uf ) + Cost(Us)) (2.7)
where Us = 2|s〉〈s| − 12k is the Grover diffusion operator. Here Cost can be any metric of
choice, such as quantum gate count or quantum circuit depth.
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In [36] it was calculated that the diffusion operator Us can be implemented as a k-fold
CNOT gate which requires 8k − 24 Toffoli gates, which easily translates to Clifford+T
gates (see previous Section).
In the next subsection we will consider several different instantiations of the function
Uf leading to a solution for the MQ problem F(x) = 0. The oracle Uf can be any of the
following:
• The MQ oracle UMQ: UMQ(a) = 1 for a ∈ Fnq if F(a) = 0 (cf. Subsection (2.2.1));
• The BooleanSolve oracle UBool: UBool(a) = 1 for a ∈ Fn−k2 if the system (2.3) is
inconsistent and the second part of the BooleanSolve algorithm on F̃ outputs b ∈ Fkq
such that F̃(b) = 0 (cf. Subsection (2.2.3));
• The Hybrid F5 oracle UHybF5: UHybF5(a) = 1 for a ∈ Fn−kq if the F5 algorithm on F̃
outputs b ∈ Fkq such that F̃(b) = 0 (cf. Subsection (2.2.2));
• The Crossbread oracle UCross: UCross(a) = 1 for a ∈ Fn−kq if the Crossbread algorithm
on P̃ outputs a solution b ∈ Fkq such that P̃(b) = 0 (cf. Subsection (2.2.4)).
2.3.3 Resource Estimates of Grover Enhanced Quantum Algorithms for
Solving the MQ Problem
On the number of solutions of the MQ problem.
As already mentioned, our proposal uses randomly generated instances F ∈MQ(n,m,Fq),
where the number of polynomials m is the same as the number of variables n. The goal
of the adversary will be to find one solution of a system F(x) = v, for a given public
value v ∈ Fn. While our key generation mechanism guarantees that this system will have
at least one solution, we don’t know the exact number of solutions which is an important
parameter in Grover’s algorithm. In the previous section we saw that it is possible to
overcome this problem by adapting Grover’s algorithm to such a setting. But, we can
actually argue that there is no need for that, and that it is safe to assume in our analysis
that the number of solutions is M = 1. Indeed, in [31], it was shown that the number of
solutions of a system of n equations in n variables follows the Poisson distribution with
parameter λ = 1 (the expected value is 1), i.e. the probability that the system has exactly
M solutions is 1eM ! . Furthermore, the probability that there are more than M solutions
can be estimated as the tail probability of a Poisson distribution which is negligible in
M . This means that with overwhelming probability, the number of solutions is very small,
and we can simply run Grover first assuming M = 1, then M = 2 and so on, until the
algorithm succeeds. In particular, since we know that the system has at least one solution,
the probability that it is the only solution is 1e−1 ≈ 0.58, and that there are at most 2
solutions 54(e−1) ≈ 0.73. Hence, the adversary has a good chance to succeed already in the
first two runs, and the probability quickly rises with each additional run. In our analysis,
we will assume that it is enough to run Grover only for M = 1 (as a lower bound of the
cost of the algorithm).
The MQ oracle.
In [60], Westerbaan and Schwabe constructed two oracles for evaluation of MQ polyno-
mials over F2 and estimated the cost of Grover’s algorithm using these oracles. Here we
will adapt their estimates for the case of any field Fq. As our metrics is mainly circuit size
and depth (and not number of qubits) we will focus on their approach for the first oracle.
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Their second oracle uses approximately half the number of qubits of their first oracle (with
a small overhead), but double the circuit size.
Following [60] we estimate that the MQ oracle UMQ over Fq requires approximately
4n2m field multiplications and as many field additions. The total depth required for the
















and the results from Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we obtain an estimate of the cost of
Exhaustive search with Grover’s algorithm. The results are summarized in Table 2.3.
Gates Depth
q n T Clifford T Total
2 128 289.46 289.82 276.54 277.63
2 192 2123.21 2123.58 2109.13 2110.23
2 224 2139.88 2140.24 2125.36 2126.45
2 256 2156.46 2156.82 2141.55 2142.64
4 72 296.55 296.97 285.02 286.15
4 96 2121.80 2122.21 2109.44 2110.57
4 112 2138.47 2138.88 2125.66 2126.79
4 128 2155.04 2155.46 2141.85 2142.98
16 32 286.63 287.08 277.21 278.38
16 40 2103.60 2104.04 293.53 294.70
16 48 2120.38 2120.83 2109.80 2110.96
16 64 2153.63 2154.08 2142.22 2143.38
31 24 287.77 288.13 278.60 279.80
31 32 2108.83 2109.19 298.84 2100.03
31 40 2129.61 2129.97 2118.98 2120.17
31 48 2150.22 2150.58 2139.06 2140.25
31 56 2170.70 2171.06 2159.09 2160.29
32 32 2103.14 2103.60 293.66 294.84
32 40 2124.11 2124.56 2113.99 2115.16
32 48 2144.89 2145.35 2134.25 2135.43
32 56 2165.56 2166.02 2154.47 2155.65
64 24 294.31 294.78 285.62 286.80
64 32 2119.56 2120.02 2110.04 2111.22
64 40 2144.52 2144.99 2134.36 2135.54
64 48 2169.31 2169.77 2158.62 2159.81
128 24 2106.66 2107.13 297.94 299.13
128 32 2135.91 2136.38 2126.36 2127.54
128 40 2164.87 2165.34 2154.67 2155.87
256 16 285.22 285.69 277.63 278.82
256 24 2118.97 2119.44 2110.21 2111.41
256 32 2152.21 2152.69 2142.63 2143.83
Table 2.3: Cost of Exhaustive search on the MQ problem using Grover’s algorithm
The HybridF5 oracle.
The Hybrid Approach includes partial evaluation of n− k variables. The cost of this part
can be computed similarly as for the MQ oracle. We found that for this part we need
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6(n− k)km multiplications and the same amount of additions. The depth of this part of
the circuit is 6(n− k) times the depth of a multiplication and 6(n− k) times the depth of
an addition.
The rest of the cost of the Hybrid Approach comes from implementing Strassen’s






























and the results from Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we obtain an estimate of the cost of
the Hybrid F5 algorithm with Grover’s search algorithm. The results are summarized in
Table 2.4.
The Crossbread oracle.
Similarly as the HybridF5 oracle, the Crossbread oracle includes partial evaluation of
n− k variables, so this cost is the same. For each enumeration, the Strassen’s algorithm is
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times the depth of an addition. An important feature of
the algorithm is that it can be split into two distinct parts: Sparse linear algebra on the
Macaulay matrix, and enumeration plus dense linear algebra to check the consistency of
the smaller system obtained from the kernel elements of M
(k)
D,d. The first part, that is more
memory demanding can always be performed on a classical computer, and the second part
which can make use of Grover’s algorithm can be performed on a quantum computer. This
is undoubtedly a big advantage over the quantum version of the Hybrid Approach, albeit
the later is in theory faster.
The cost of the entire algorithm for various parameters is given in Table 2.5.
The BooleanSolve oracle.
For the BooleanSolve oracle, the cost of the partial evaluation of n− k is the same as for





using a sparse linear algebra technique from [34]. For simplicity, we will lower bound the
















The cost of the entire algorithm for various parameters is given in Table 2.6.
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Gates Depth
q n k T Clifford T Total
2 120 59 254.28 2132.95 242.50 243.65
2 128 63 256.56 2136.83 244.59 245.74
2 168 83 267.73 2166.86 254.99 256.14
2 192 95 274.31 2189.50 261.18 262.34
2 232 115 285.12 2219.10 271.46 272.62
4 72 35 260.16 2127.84 249.27 250.39
4 96 47 273.40 2158.07 261.69 262.80
4 104 51 277.74 2164.57 265.80 266.92
4 128 63 290.64 2204.70 278.10 279.22
4 136 67 294.90 2211.07 282.19 283.32
16 48 23 273.00 2113.80 262.70 263.77
16 64 31 290.24 2145.32 279.11 280.20
16 72 35 298.74 2165.84 287.28 288.36
16 88 43 2115.61 2197.35 2103.57 2104.66
31 40 18 2113.40 2113.77 272.64 273.83
31 48 20 2131.12 2131.49 287.79 288.98
31 56 22 2148.41 2148.78 2102.89 2104.08
31 64 28 2166.05 2166.41 2108.04 2109.23
31 72 30 2183.23 2183.59 2123.09 2124.28
32 40 19 275.22 2113.09 265.26 266.33
32 56 27 296.67 2149.02 285.74 286.82
32 64 31 2107.25 2162.14 295.94 297.01
32 72 35 2117.75 2184.66 2106.10 2107.18
64 40 19 286.14 2123.85 276.02 277.09
64 48 23 298.92 2139.38 288.29 289.36
64 56 27 2111.59 2163.78 2100.51 2101.58
64 64 31 2124.16 2178.90 2112.70 2113.77
128 32 15 282.03 2108.29 272.43 273.49
128 40 19 296.99 2134.57 286.75 287.82
128 48 23 2111.78 2152.11 2101.01 2102.08
128 56 27 2126.44 2178.51 2115.23 2116.30
256 32 15 290.84 2116.99 281.12 282.19
256 40 19 2107.80 2145.27 297.44 298.51
256 48 23 2124.58 2164.80 2113.70 2114.77
256 56 27 2141.25 2193.20 2129.93 2130.99
Table 2.4: Cost of applying the Hybrid F5 algorithm on theMQ problem using Grover’s
algorithm
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Classical part Gates Depth
q n k Field. op. T Clifford T Total
2 128 21 269.79 276.69 277.05 266.20 267.31
2 160 25 291.87 291.60 291.96 280.54 281.64
2 192 27 2105.09 2107.26 2107.62 295.82 296.92
2 224 30 2118.36 2122.36 2122.73 2110.55 2111.65
2 296 35 2154.47 2156.92 2157.28 2144.46 2145.57
4 88 19 292.65 292.46 292.88 282.45 283.59
4 96 19 288.24 2100.74 2101.16 290.59 291.74
4 120 23 2115.69 2121.67 2122.09 2110.93 2112.07
4 128 24 2124.76 2128.93 2129.34 2118.02 2119.17
4 160 28 2154.32 2157.81 2158.23 2146.36 2147.50
16 48 17 285.02 284.87 285.33 275.77 276.93
16 56 19 294.79 297.51 297.96 288.01 289.18
16 72 23 2123.38 2122.54 2123.00 2112.41 2113.57
16 80 25 2133.03 2134.98 2135.43 2124.57 2125.74
16 96 28 2156.92 2161.71 2162.16 2150.86 2152.03
31 48 20 297.57 299.27 299.63 289.33 290.52
31 56 22 2112.01 2114.76 2115.13 2104.47 2105.66
31 64 24 2126.43 2130.17 2130.54 2119.57 2120.76
31 72 27 2140.84 2143.07 2143.43 2132.12 2133.31
31 80 28 2151.00 2160.81 2161.18 2149.67 2150.86
32 48 19 293.55 295.95 296.41 286.65 287.83
32 64 24 2126.43 2124.65 2125.12 2114.60 2115.78
32 72 26 2136.64 2140.14 2140.60 2129.79 2130.97
32 80 28 2151.00 2155.57 2156.03 2144.96 2146.14
32 88 29 2156.56 2173.44 2173.90 2162.63 2163.81
64 40 18 286.85 289.13 289.60 280.17 281.34
64 48 21 2105.20 2104.90 2105.37 295.45 296.63
64 56 24 2119.83 2120.56 2121.03 2110.69 2111.87
64 64 27 2138.24 2136.13 2136.60 2125.89 2127.07
64 72 27 2140.84 2160.58 2161.05 2150.14 2151.32
128 40 19 290.48 296.99 297.47 287.93 289.11
128 56 26 2130.80 2129.93 2130.41 2119.94 2121.12
128 64 27 2138.24 2154.98 2155.45 2144.71 2145.89
128 72 27 2140.84 2183.43 2183.90 2172.96 2174.15
256 32 15 268.54 290.84 291.32 282.39 283.58
256 48 23 2112.38 2124.58 2125.06 2114.96 2116.14
256 64 27 2138.24 2173.79 2174.26 2163.48 2164.67




n k T Clifford T Total
144 71 261.06 2112.88 248.76 269.46
160 79 265.52 2119.58 252.92 274.75
192 95 274.31 2138.99 261.18 288.25
208 103 278.66 2151.94 265.30 296.57
256 127 291.55 2177.46 277.60 2115.13
264 131 293.68 2180.51 279.65 2117.65




The Sakumoto-Shirai-Hiwatari (SSH) 5-pass IDS scheme
3.1 Description of the SSH 5-pass IDS
In [44], Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari proposed two new identification schemes, a 3-pass
and a 5-pass IDS, based on the intractability of theMQ problem. In these specifications,
and documents related to this submission, we will refer to identification schemes from [44]
as the SSH 3-pass and 5-pass schemes.
Unlike previous public key schemes, the SSH schemes provably rely only on the MQ
problem (and the security of the commitment scheme), and not on other related problems
in multivariate cryptography such as the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) [52], the related
Extended IP [24] and IP with partial knowledge [56] problems or the MinRank problem
[21, 29].
The main idea from [44] is a clever splitting of the secret, that relies on the polar form
of the function F. With this technique, the secret s is split into s = r0 + r1, and the
public v = F(s) can be represented as v = F(r0) + F(r1) + G(r0, r1). In order for the
polar form not to depend on both shares of the secret, r0 and F(r0) are further split as
αr0 = t0 + t1 and αF(r0) = e0 + e1. Now, because of the bilinearity of the polar form it
holds that αv = (e1 + αF(r1) + G(t1, r1)) + (e0 + G(t0, r1)), and from only one of the
two summands, represented by (r1, t1, e1) and (r1, t0, e0), nothing can be learned about
the secret s.
Let (pk, sk) = ((F,v), s) ∈ RMQ be the public and private keys of the prover P (i.e.,
key generation just samples from theMQ relation). The SSH 5-pass IDS from [44] is given
in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Properties of the SSH 5-pass IDS
The following theorem summarizes the properties of the SSH 5-pass IDS.
Theorem 3.1. The 5-pass identification scheme of Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari [44]:
1. Has key relation RMQ(m,n,q),
2. Is KOW if the MQ search problem is hard on average,
3. Is perfectly correct,
4. Is computationally HVZK when the commitment scheme Com is computationally hid-
ing,




2q when the com-
mitment scheme Com is computationally binding,
P(pk, sk) V(pk)
//setup
r0, t0 ←R Fnq , e0 ←R Fmq
r1 ← s− r0
//commit
c0 ← Com(r0, t0, e0)
c1 ← Com(r1,G(t0, r1) + e0) com = (c0, c1) //challenge 1
α←R Fq
//first response ch1 = α
t1 ← αr0 − t0
e1 ← αF(r0)− e0 resp1 = (t1, e1) //challenge 2
ch2 ←R {0, 1}
//second response ch2
If ch2 = 0, resp2 ← r0
Else resp2 ← r1 resp2 //verify
If ch2 = 0, parse resp2 = r0, check
c0
?
= Com(r0, αr0 − t1, αF(r0)− e1)
Else, parse resp2 = r1, check
c1
?
= Com(r1, α(v− F(r1))−G(t1, r1)− e1)
Fig. 3.1: The SSH 5-pass IDS by Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari [44]
6. Is sound with soundness error 12 +
1
2q when the commitment scheme Com is computa-
tionally binding,
7. Has a q2-Extractor when the commitment scheme Com is computationally binding.
The first statement holds by construction. The second statement follows directly from
the first. The third, a stronger version of the fourth1 and the fifth were proven in [44]. The
last two statements were proven in [16].
1 Sakumoto et al. [44] proved that their 5-pass scheme is statistically zero knowledge when the commit-
ment scheme Com is statistically hiding which implies (honest-verifier) zero knowledge. Relaxing the
requirements of Com to computationally hiding, weakens the result to computationally HVZK, since
now, it is possible to distinguish (albeit only with negligible probability) whether the commitment was




The Fiat-Shamir paradigm [30] for transforming canonical 3-pass identification schemes to
signatures has been one the most popular methods for obtaining classically secure signature
schemes. In this chapter, we present the transform, known results about its security, as
well as its limitations.
4.1 Description of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
In what follows, let IDSr = (KGenIDS,Pr,Vr) denote the parallel composition of r rounds
of the identification scheme IDS = (KGenIDS,P,V).
Construction 4.1 (Fiat-Shamir transform [30]) Let k ∈ N the security parameter,
IDS = (KGenIDS,P,V), where P = (P0,P1), V = (ChS,Vf IDS) a canonical 3-pass Identi-
fication scheme that achieves soundness with soundness error κ. Select r, the number of
(parallel) rounds of IDS, such that κr = negl(k), and that the challenge space Cr of the
composition IDSr, has exponential size in k. Moreover, select a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Cr.
A signature scheme derived from IDS via the Fiat-Shamir transform is a triplet of




Fig. 4.1: Fiat-Shamir key generation
Sign(sk,M)
For j ∈ {1, . . . , r} do
(state(j), com(j))← P0(sk)
state := (state(1), . . . , state(r))
com := (com(1), . . . , com(r))
σ0 := com
ch← H(pk,M, σ0)
Parse ch as ch = (ch(1), ch(2), . . . , ch(r)), ch(j) ∈ C
For j ∈ {1, . . . , r} do
resp(j) ← P1(state(j), ch(j))
resp := (resp(1), . . . , resp(r))
σ1 := resp
Return σ = (σ0, σ1)
Fig. 4.2: Fiat-Shamir signature generation
Vf(pk, σ,M)
Parse σ = (σ0, σ1)
Parse σ0 as σ0 = (com
(1), . . . , com(r))
ch← H(pk,M, σ0)
Parse ch as ch = (ch(1), ch(2), . . . , ch(r)), ch(j) ∈ C
Parse σ1 as σ1 = (resp
(1), . . . , resp(r))
For j ∈ {1, . . . , r} do
b(j) ← Vf IDS(pk, com(j), ch(j), resp(j))
b← b(1) ∧ b(2) ∧ · · · ∧ b(r)
Return b
Fig. 4.3: Fiat-Shamir signature verification
4.2 Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
The security of the Fiat-Shamir transform has been investigated for over two decades.
The first security proof of the transform was given in the seminal paper of Pointcheval
and Stern [53]. They showed that assuming honest-verifier zero knowledge and special
soundness of the identification scheme, Construction 5.1 gives EU-CMA secure signatures.
Their proof is in the random oracle model and is based on the (now famous) forking
lemma. The two main techniques introduced in the forking lemma are rewinding of the
adversary and adaptively programming the random oracle. While these have proven to be
quite powerful techniques in ROM reductions, they come with a drawback - the reduction
is not tight - there is loss of factor the number of adversary’s random oracle queries.
Later, Ohta and Okamoto [51] provide a different proof using a modular technique and
similar assumptions on the identification scheme. Abdalla et al.[1] show that a signature
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via the Fiat-Shamir transform is EU-CMA if and only if the identification scheme is IMP-
PA, thus minimizing the needed assumption on the identification scheme.
Lately, the main two techniques from the forking lemma cause even more problems
in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM) and showing the Fiat-Shamir
transform secure in the QROM has proven to be a tedious task (see [2, 22, 59]). Until
around 3 weeks before the deadline for Second round tweaks, there were only two known
ways to show security of the Fiat-Shamir transform in the QROM setting - using obliv-
ious commitments [22], and using so called lossy identification schemes [41]. In the first
approach, the need for rewinding is replaced by introducing an additional trapdoor as-
sumption on the commitments, which in itself is a very strong and problematic assumption.
The second approach seems more realistic, since it only requires existence of ’fake’ public
keys indistinguishable from the ’real’ ones, for which on the other hand it is hard to find a
matching private key. Just a few days ago, a paper claiming to have proven the security of
Fiat-Shamir appeared on eprint [26]. The claims are certainly very exciting, but due to the
short time until the submission deadline, we will not further comment these results. Note
that they potentially open the doors for proving the security of MQDSS in the QROM as
well, provided it is possible to extend their results to 5-pass schemes.
Very recently, multi-user security of the Fiat-Shamir transform has been investigated in
[42]. Although the authors of [42] attempt to provide a more general framework for multi-
user security (previously, tight results have been obtained only for Schnorr like signatures
[10]), the assumptions on the IDS still seem too strong to be applicable on many post-
quantum schemes. Thus for now, the only general result remains the one from [32], with




The Fiat-Shamir Transform for 5-pass Identification
Schemes
For several intractability assumptions, the most efficient IDS are five pass, i.e. IDS where a
transcript consists of five messages. Here, efficiency refers to the size of all communication
of sufficient rounds to make the soundness error negligible. This becomes especially relevant
when one wants to turn an IDS into a signature scheme as it is closely related to the
signature size of the resulting scheme.
As said in the Preliminaries (Chapter 1), the most common 5-pass identification
schemes in the literature are those with challenge spaces C1 and C2 restricted to q and
2 respectively, that we called q2 -Identification Schemes. In this chapter, we restrict our
attention to such schemes and describe a transformation from passively secure q2 - IDS to
unforgeable signatures. The transformation is a direct generalization of the Fiat-Shamir
transform for 3-pass schemes (see Chapter 4). The description and security argument
follow closely the one from [16], where we first introduced MQDSS.
Note that the Fiat-Shamir transform can be generalized to more general canonical
2n+1 schemes with non-binary challenge spaces. However, this makes the description and
proofs unnecessarily complex, especially because such schemes are not at all common in
the literature.
5.1 A Fiat-Shamir transform for q2 -Identification Schemes
As in the previous chapter, let IDSr = (KGenIDS,Pr,Vr) denote the parallel composition
of r rounds of the identification scheme IDS = (KGenIDS,P,V).
Construction 5.1 (Fiat-Shamir transform for q2 -Identification Schemes) Let k ∈
N be the security parameter and let IDS = (KGenIDS,P,V), where P = (P0,P1,P2),
V = (ChS1,ChS2,Vf IDS) be a q2 -Identification Scheme that achieves soundness with sound-
ness error κ. Select r, the number of (parallel) rounds of IDS, such that κr = negl(k), and
that the challenge spaces Cr1 and C
r
2 of the composition IDS
r, have exponential size in k.
Moreover, select two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Cr1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Cr2.
A q2 -signature scheme q2 -Dss(1k) is a triplet of algorithms (KGen,Sign,Vf) defined as




Fig. 5.1: q2 -signature scheme: Key generation
Sign(sk,M)
For j ∈ {1, . . . , r} do
(state(j), com(j))← P0(sk)
state := (state(1), . . . , state(r))
com := (com(1), . . . , com(r))
σ0 := com
h1 ← H1(pk,M, σ0)
















state := (state(1), . . . , state(r))
resp1 := (resp
(1)




h2 ← H2(pk,M, σ0, σ1)






















Return σ = (σ0, σ1, σ2)
Fig. 5.2: q2 -signature scheme: Signature generation
The correctness of the scheme follows immediately from the correctness of the IDS.
5.2 Security of q2-signature schemes.
The security of the above transform was proven in [16]. The proof is in the random oracle
model and builds on techniques introduced by Pointcheval and Stern [53]. Namely, we
generalized the well known Forking Lemma and showed that a particular type of rewinding
of the adversary together with adaptive programming of the random oracles is useful for
showing EU-CMA security. For completeness of this document, we include the complete
security reduction in Appendix A1.
In summary, the following theorem holds for q2-signature schemes:
1 In [16], the claim was proven for a stronger assumption for the q2-IDS- being Honest Verifier Zero-




Parse σ = (σ0, σ1, σ2)
Parse σ0 as σ0 = (com
(1), . . . , com(r))
h1 ← H1(pk,M, σ0)









Parse σ1 as σ1 = (resp
(1)
1 , . . . , resp
(r)
1 )
h2 ← H2(pk,M, σ0, σ1)









Parse σ2 as σ2 = (resp
(1)
2 , . . . , resp
(r)
2 )
For j ∈ {1, . . . , r} do







b← b(1) ∧ b(2) ∧ · · · ∧ b(r)
Return b
Fig. 5.3: q2 -signature scheme: Signature verification
Theorem 5.2 (EU-CMA security of q2-signature schemes [16]). Let k ∈ N, IDS(1k)
a q2-IDS that has a key relation R, is KOW secure, is computationally honest-verifier zero-
knowledge, and has a q2-extractor E. Then q2 -Dss(1k), the q2-signature scheme derived
applying Construction 5.1 is existentially unforgeable under classical adaptive chosen mes-
sage attacks.
Very recently, Don, Fehr and Majenz [25] proved the QROM security of the multi-round
Fiat-Shamir transform. They showed the following result. For details see [25].
Theorem 5.3 (Theorem 23 [25]). Let P be a public coin interactive proof system for
some hard relation R, which is a quantum proof of knowledge and satisfies completeness,
honest-verifier zero-knowledge, and has unpredictable commitments as well as a superpoly-
nomially large challenge space. Then the signature scheme derived applying the multi-round
Fiat-Shamir transform is existentially unforgeable under quantum chosen message attacks
(EU-CMA). If P in addition has computationally unique responses, the obtained signature
scheme is strongly existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (sEU-CMA).
Theorem 5.3 directly applies to q2-signature schemes as a special case, thus providing








Throughout this part we will use the standard mathematical notations introduced in
Section 1.1. In addition, in Chapter 9 we will use the following notations:
• a+ b - sum of a and b
• a− b - difference of a and b
• a · b - product of a and b
• a/b - quotient of a and b
• log2 a - logarithm to the base 2 of a
• a mod b - the non-negative remainder of the integer division of a and b
• a|b - a is a divisor of b
• dae - ceiling function, returns the smallest integer greater than or equal to a
• bac - floor function, returns the greatest integer larger than or equal to a
• a← b - assignment operator, a takes the value of b
• a b - logical left shift, with b being non-negative integer. It is equivalent to a · 2b
• a ∧ b - logical and operator
• a == b - logical equal test, returns true (1) if a = b and false (0) if a 6= b
• a <> b - logical non-equal test, returns true (1) if a 6= b and false (0) if a = b
• [ ] - empty array of bytes or bits
• a[i] - the i-th element of the array a. The indexing of elements starts from 0.
• [f(j)|j = 0..n− 1] - array with elements f(j), when j is iterated from 0 through n− 1
• len(a) - returns the length of a (the number of elements in a if we consider it as an
array)
• a||b - concatenation of a and b. If we look at a = [a[0], a[1], . . . , a[la]] and b =
[b[0], b[1], . . . , b[l2]] as arrays, then a||b is the array [a[0], a[1], . . . , a[la], b[0], b[1], . . . , b[l2]]
• append(a, b) - appends the element b to the end of the array a
• subarray(a, b, c) - returns the subarray of a from index b to c − 1, i.e. returns
[a[b], . . . , a[c− 1]]
• trunc(a, b) - truncates the b least significant bits of a, with a being a bit-array and b a
non-negative integer. If we look at a in its array representation a = [a[0], a[1], . . . , a[la]],
then trunc(a, b)=[a[0], a[1], . . . , a[b− 1]]. It is equivalent to subarray(a, 0, b), for a bit-
array a.
• trim(a, b) - truncates the b most significant bits of a, with a being a bit-array and b a
non-negative integer. It is equivalent to subarray(a,len(a)− b,len(a)), for a bit-array a.
• mask(a, b, c) - sets the bits a[b], . . . , a[c] to 0
• SHAKE256(seed, outlen) - interface for outlen bytes of SHAKE256 output on input
seed as standardized in FIPS 202, the SHA-3 standard [49].
• SHAKE256absorb(seed) - interface for the absorb phase of SHAKE256 for extendable
output
• SHAKE256squeeze(state)- interface for the squeeze phase of SHAKE256 for extendable




MQDSS High Level Description
In this chapter, we define the signature scheme MQDSS-q-n in generic terms by describing
the required parameters, the functions KGen, Sign and Vf, and the necessary auxiliary
functions. In Chapter 8 we will provide concrete parameters and in Chapter 9 we provide
a detailed instantiations of the auxiliary functions. A detailed low-level description will be
given in Chapter 9.
MQDSS-q-n is a digital signature scheme consisting of three algorithms KGen, Sign and
Vf, defined in Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. The global parameters and auxiliary functions are
defined in Section 7.1.
7.1 MQDSS Parameters Description and Auxiliary Functions
Let k be the security parameter.
MQDSS-q-n uses the following additional parameters:
• A positive integer n ∈ N - the number of variables and equations of the system F,
• A positive integer q ∈ N (a prime or a prime power) - the order of the finite field Fq,
• A positive integer r ∈ N - the number of rounds.
MQDSS-q-n uses the following auxiliary functions:
• A pseudorandom generator PRGsk : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}4k used to randomly generate four
seeds.
• A pseudorandom generator PRGs : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ndlog2 qe used to randomly generate
the secret key.
• A pseudorandom generator PRGρ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}4rk used to generate
pseudorandom values needed as input to the string commitment functions.
• A pseudorandom generator PRGrte : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}3rndlog2 qe used to gen-
erate pseudorandom values during the signature generation.
• An extendable output function XOFF : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}Flen , where for q = 2, Flen =
n · (n·(n−1)2 + n) and for q > 2, Flen = n · (
n·(n+1)
2 + n) dlog2 qe. This function is used
for generating a multivariate system F by expanding a seed outputted by PRGsk.
• Three cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2k, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Fqr, and
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r.
• A string commitment function Com0 : {0, 1}2k × Fqn × Fqn × Fqn → {0, 1}2k and
• A string commitment function Com1 : {0, 1}2k × Fqn × Fqn → {0, 1}2k.
7.2 MQDSS Key Generation
The MQDSS-q-n key generation algorithm formally samples a MQ relation. Practically,
the algorithm is realized as shown in Figure 7.1.
KGen()
sk←R {0, 1}k






Fig. 7.1: MQDSS-q-n key generation
In more detail, given the security parameter k, the key generation algorithm KGen()
performs the following operations:
• Randomly sample a secret key of k bits sk←R {0, 1}k.
• Use the secret key sk as input (seed) to PRGsk to derive the following values:
– SF, a seed of k bits from which the system parameter F is expanded;
– Ss, a seed of k bits from which the secret input to the MQ function is generated;




1 , i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
needed for the string commitment functions. Note that this seed is not yet needed
during key generation, but is required during signing.






0 , i ∈
{1, . . . , r}. Note that this seed is not yet needed during key generation, but is
required during signing.
• Expand the seed SF using XOFF to a Flen bits long string, where for q = 2, Flen =
n · (n·(n−1)2 +n) and for q > 2, Flen = n · (
n·(n+1)
2 +n) dlog2 qe. Parse the pseudorandom
string as an MQ system F ∈MQ(n, n,Fq).
• Use the seed Ss as input to the PRGs to obtain s, a string of length n dlog2 qe bits,
that will be used as the secret input to the MQ function;
• Parse s as a vector s ∈ Fnq , and evaluate the MQ system F(s) to obtain the vector
v ∈ Fnq .
• Set pk := (SF,v) as the public key.
• Return the public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
The obtained public key pk is of length k+ n dlog2 qe bits, and the secret key sk of length
k bits.
7.3 MQDSS Signature Generation
For the MQDSS-q-n signing procedure Sign(), we assume as input a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a secret key sk. The signing procedure is given in Figure 7.2.
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Sign(sk,M)
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σ0 ← H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r))
ch1 ← H1(D,σ0)
Parse ch1 as ch1 = (α
(1), α(2), . . . , α(r)), α(j) ∈ Fq























σ1 ← (resp(1)1 ||resp
(2)
1 || . . . ||resp
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ch2 ← H2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1)
Parse ch2 as ch2 = (b
(1), b(2), . . . , b(r)), b(j) ∈ {0, 1}






σ2 ← (resp(1)2 ||resp
(2)











|| . . . ||ρ(r)
b(r)
)
Return σ = (R, σ0, σ1, σ2)
Fig. 7.2: MQDSS-q-n signature generation
In more details, the signer:
• First effectively repeats the KGen() procedure i.e.,
– derives SF, Ss, Sρ, Srte from PRGsk(sk),
– expands F = XOFF(SF) and s = PRGs(Ss) and
– derives the public key pk := (SF,F(s)).
• Derives a message dependent random value R = H(sk ‖ M).
• Using this random value R, the signer computes the randomized message digest D =
H(R ‖ m). The value R must be included in the signature, so that a verifier can derive
the same randomized digest.
• Next, the signer uses the pseudorandom generator PRGρ to generate the values
ρ
(1)




1 , . . . , ρ
(r)
1 from Sρ and D.
• The signer then uses the pseudorandom generator PRGrte to sample the vectors
r
(1)








0 , . . . , e
(r)
0 from Srte and D.
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• For each j ∈ {1, . . . , r}
– Computes r
(j)
1 as the difference s− r
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• Computes the second part of the signature σ0 as a digest over the concatenation of all
commitments σ0 ← H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r)),
• Derives the first challenge ch1 = (α(1), α(2), . . . , α(r)) by applying H1 to (D,σ0).











0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r},




1 ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
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• The signer computes ch2 by applying H2 to the tuple (D,σ0, ch1, σ1) and parses it as
r binary challenges b(j) ∈ {0, 1}.




• Finally, the signer computes the last part of the signature as
σ2 ← (resp(1)2 ||resp
(2)











|| . . . ||ρ(r)
b(r)
), and
• Outputs the signature σ = (R, σ0, σ1, σ2).
The complete signature is of the following form:
σ = (R,H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r)), (resp(1)1 ||resp
(2)
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each require 2k bits, the
signature is 4k + (4k + 3n dlog2 qe)r bits long.
7.4 MQDSS Signature Verification
Upon receiving a message M , a signature σ = (R, σ0, σ1, σ2), and a public key pk = (SF,v),
the verifier performs the verification routine as listed in Figure 7.3.
In more detail, the main goal of the verification process is to reconstruct the missing
commitments, and calculate a value σ′0 that will be verified against the inputted σ0. The
whole procedure is as follows:
• Using the pubic key pk = (SF,v) and the value R from the signature σ, compute
the system parameter F ← XOFF(SF) and the randomized message digest D ←
H(pk||R||M).
• Since the signature contains σ0, compute the first challenge ch1 as ch1 ← H1(D,σ0)
and parse it as ch1 = (α
(1), α(2), . . . , α(r)), α(j) ∈ Fq
• Next, compute the challenge ch2 ← H2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1), from the two parts σ0, σ1
of the signature and the computed ch1 in the previous step. Parse it as ch2 =






Parse ch1 as ch1 = (α
(1), α(2), . . . , α(r)), α(j) ∈ Fq
ch2 ← H2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1)
Parse ch2 as ch2 = (b
(1), b(2), . . . , b(r)), b(j) ∈ {0, 1}
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σ′0 ← H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r))
Return σ′0 == σ0
Fig. 7.3: MQDSS-q-n signature verification
• Parse the two signature parts σ1 and σ2 as σ1 = (resp(1)1 ||resp
(2)






















• Since the verifier knows the values b(j) from the previous step, he knows which of the
two parts of the commitments com(j) were included in σ2, and can now proceed to
recovering the other, missing part. This is done for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r} as follows:
– Parse resp
(j)














































• Calculate σ′0 ← H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r)) from the obtained commitments com(j)
• Return the truth value of σ′0 == σ0. This means that for verification to succeed,





8.1 Reference Parameter Sets
Recall (c.f. Section 7.1) that MQDSS-q-n is parameterized by the parameters:
• A positive integer k ∈ N - the security parameter,
• A positive integer n ∈ N - the number of variables and equations of the system F,
• A positive integer q ∈ N (a prime or a prime power) - the order of the finite field Fq,
• A positive integer r ∈ N - the number of rounds.
We propose the following two parameter sets as reference parameter sets of MQDSS:12
• MQDSS-31-48
– k = 128, q = 31, n = 48, r = 184;
• MQDSS-31-64
– k = 192, q = 31, n = 64, r = 277.
The following Table 8.1 summarizes the basic characteristics of these two parameter sets.
Security
category







MQDSS-31-48 1-2 128 31 48 184 46 16 28400
MQDSS-31-64 3-4 192 31 64 277 64 24 59928
Table 8.1: Basic characteristics of the reference parameter sets
We have calculated the key sizes and the signature size based on the formulas provided
in Section 7.1: The public key is of length k + n dlog2 qe bits, the secret key sk of length
k bits and the signature of length 4k + (4k + 3n dlog2 qe)r bits3. The number of rounds is
calculated as the smallest r s.t.
1
Pr(N)













1 In Version 2.0, for MQDSS-31-48, we had r = 135; for MQDSS-31-64, we had r = 202; The number of







2 In Version 1.0, for MQDSS-31-48, we had k = 256 and r = 269; for MQDSS-31-64, we had k = 384 and
r = 403;
3 In Version 1.0, the signature size was calculated as 2k + (k + 3n dlog2 qe)r.
We also summarize the strength of the reference parameter sets with respect to the
best classical and quantum attacks (see Chapter 10). The summary is given in Table 8.2.
For more detailed analysis of the algorithms see Chapter 2.
Best classical attack Best quantum attack
algorithm Gates algorithm Gates Depth
MQDSS-31-48 HybridF5 2160 Crossbread 299 290
MQDSS-31-64 HybridF5 2206 Crossbread 2130 2120
Table 8.2: Best classical and quantum attacks against the reference parameter sets
Remark 8.1. The estimated security of MQDSS-31-64 given in Table 8.2 seems smaller
than the required for Security category 3 and 4. However, not all cost is included in the
estimate. In particular, the memory requirement for the best attack(s) is huge (the time
complexity is only a cube of the memory complexity). This necessarily introduces a huge
penalty for memory manipulation. Unfortunately, this is very difficult to estimate, and
we have not done it. We hope the community will soon have more insight into this an in
general into how to estimate accurately the complexity of memory expensive algorithms.
As part of the submission package we provide reference (and additional) implementa-
tions for the two reference parameter sets MQDSS-31-48 and MQDSS-31-64. The details
of the implementations are given in Chapter 9 and Chapter 15.
We emphasize that the chosen reference parameter sets are not the only that are suit-
able for use, and that should be considered by NIST and the broader community in the
evaluation process. In the next section we provide additional parameter sets of comparable
performance and security strength but over different fields. We decided to keep the original
choice of the field as was initially proposed in [16], and to provide implementations only
for parameters over F31. We justify our decision in the next section. To match the security
levels identified by NIST, we changed the number of rounds in MQDSS-31-64 compared to
[16] from 269 to 2774 to match Category 3 and 4, and additionally proposed the lower se-
curity set MQDSS-31-48 (not in [16]). Furthermore, we decided not to include a parameter
set for the Categories 5 and 6 defined by NIST. Over F31 this would be MQDSS-31-88 or
even MQDSS-31-96. If NIST shows interest in such a parameter set, it is simple to extend
our implementations and performance analysis to this set as well.
We continue the discussion about the additional parameter sets in the next Section.
8.2 Additional Parameter Sets
In addition to MQDSS-31-48 and MQDSS-31-64 we recommend additional parameter sets
of comparable security strength i.e. Categories 1-4, as identified by NIST [50], but over
different fields. We also provide parameter sets for the much higher security categories 5
and 6. Their basic characteristics and best attacks are given in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. It is
important to note that for the additional recommended parameter sets, we do not provide
implementation.
4 202 in Version 2.0
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It can be noticed that within a security category, the parameter sets over F16 and F32
are of very similar performance characteristics as the reference parameter sets over F31.
However, we decided not to include these in the reference parameter sets.
Our decision is based on two main observations: 1. The field F31 is the most natural
choice with respect to implementation of the field arithmetic, since any platform already
contains instructions for multiplication of natural numbers, but no instructions for F16 or
F32. For these fields in general we would have to design specific representations for fast
multiplication, or use table lookup instructions. 2. Our optimized implementation using
AVX2 instructions is much faster over F31 than F16 or F32.
On the other hand, as F16 and F32 are binary fields, these parameter sets are particularly
interesting for hardware implementations. In light of the new attack against MQDSS [39],
it seems that the parameters defined over F32 have better performance reflected in the
signature size.
Moe generally, in the evaluation process we encourage NIST and the community to treat
MQDSS-16-56, MQDSS-16-72, MQDSS-32-48 and MQDSS-32-64 with the same level of
attention as the reference parameter sets.
Security
category







1-2 128 4 88 316 38 16 41144
1-2 128 16 56 204 44 16 30256
1-2 128 32 48 183 46 16 28246
1-2 128 64 40 171 46 16 26398
3-4 192 4 128 476 56 24 91488
3-4 192 16 72 307 60 24 62724
3-4 192 32 64 276 64 24 59712
3-4 192 64 64 257 72 24 61776
5-6 256 4 160 637 72 32 158104
5-6 256 16 96 410 80 32 111648
5-6 256 31 88 370 87 32 108538
5-6 256 32 88 369 87 32 108245
5-6 256 64 88 343 98 32 111946




Best classical attack Best quantum attack
q n algorithm Gates algorithm Gates Depth
1-2 4 88 Crossbread 2156 Crossbread 293 283
1-2 16 56 HybridF5 2171 Crossbread 298 289
1-2 32 48 HybridF5 2161 Crossbread 296 288
1-2 64 40 HybridF5 2145 Crossbread 289 281
3-4 4 128 Crossbread 2230 Crossbread 2129 2119
3-4 16 72 HybridF5 2211 Crossbread 2123 2113
3-4 32 64 HybridF5 2207 Crossbread 2125 2115
3-4 64 64 HybridF5 2220 Crossbread 2136 2127
5-6 4 160 Crossbread 2290 Crossbread 2158 2147
5-6 16 96 HybridF5 2273 Crossbread 2162 2152
5-6 31 88 HybridF5 2275 Crossbread 2179 2168
5-6 32 88 HybridF5 2276 Crossbread 2174 2164
5-6 64 88 HybridF5 2293 Crossbread 2203 2192
Table 8.4: Best classical and quantum attacks against the additional parameter sets
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Low Level Description of MQDSS
In Chapter 7, we described the MQDSS scheme in general terms. Here, we complete the
specification by giving the byte-level details that should allow an implementer to write a
compatible implementation.
This low level description will focus on our reference parameter sets as defined in Sec-
tion 8.1. Thus, we will assume that q = 31, and the underlying field of operation is F31.
To provide a slightly more general framework, we will define all functions in terms of
parameters k, n ∈ N, such that 64|k and 8|n. (Such a description will allow application of
the following detailed specifications not only to the reference parameter sets, but also to
parameter sets over F31 of different security level.)
9.1 Auxiliary Functions
9.1.1 Secret Key Expansion
The secret key of MQDSS, denoted by sk is a k/8-byte string. It is used in the key
generation process (see Section 7.2) and in the signing process (see Section 7.3) where it
is first expanded to four separate values: SF, Ss, Sρ and Srte. This is done by expanding
to k/2 bytes, and interpreting the first k/8 bytes as SF, the second k/8 as Ss, the third
k/8 as Sρ and the last k/8 as Srte (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 SecretKeyExpansion(sk)
Input: sk
block ← SHAKE256(sk, 4k/8)
SF ← subarray(block, 0, k/8)
Ss ← subarray(block, k/8, 2k/8)
Sρ ← subarray(block, 2k/8, 3k/8)
Srte ← subarray(block, 3k/8, 4k/8)
Output: SF, Ss, Sρ Srte
9.1.2 Expanding SF, Ss and Srte
The functions XOFF, PRGs and PRGrte are instantiated using rejection sampling of
the output of the extendable output function SHAKE256 standardized in FIPS 202, the
SHA-3 standard [49]. The rejection sampling works as follows: For each output byte of
SHAKE256, we ignore the most significant three bits. We discard the resulting value if
it is equal to 31 when interpreted as an unsigned integer (i.e. all five bits are set). See
Algorithm 2 for details.




while len(array31) < len do
block ← SHAKE256squeeze(state)
i← 0
while i <len(block) ∧ len(array31) < len do
cand← block[i]







Using Algorithm 2 we can easily expand all the necessary values. F is obtained by direct
application of the RejectSample algorithm. The output elements are then interpreted as
integers. The elements of F are in signed integers between -15 and 15, inclusive. We
bring the randomly sampled integer to this domain by subtracting 15. Algorithm 3 is our
wrapper for this function.
Algorithm 3 MQ system(SF)
Input: SF
F←RejectSample(SF, n(n(n+1)2 + n))




The secret vector s is derived similarly, with the crucial difference that the secret key
elements are not transformed to signed integers. The random elements for the vectors r0,
t0 and e0 are derived from the seed Srte in exactly the same way as the secret vector.
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At the core of the scheme lies evaluation of the F function, and its bilinear counterpart G.
The evaluation of F can roughly be divided in two parts: the generation of all quadratic
terms, and computation of the resulting polynomials for given terms.
For the generation of the quadratic terms, we construct the terms in a variant of
graded reverse lexicographic order. We note that for most platforms, this is not the most
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Algorithm 5 RTEexpand(Srte, D)
Input: Srte
arrayrte ←RejectSample(Srte||D, 3rn)
arrayr ←subarray(arrayrte, 0, rn)
arrayt ←subarray(arrayrte, rn, 2rn)
arraye ←subarray(arrayrte, 2rn, 3rn)
r← [], t← [], e← []
for 0 6 i < rn; i← i+ n do
append(r, subarray(arrayr, i, i+ n))
append(t, subarray(arrayt, i, i+ n))
append(e, subarray(arraye, i, i+ n))
end for
Output: r, t, e
efficient way to generate the quadratic terms [16], but it provides a reasonably straight-
forward method that has decent average performance. Adhering to the same order is crucial
for implementations to be compatible, as this determines which elements of the system
parameter coincide with which terms.
In order to somewhat accommodate platforms that have combined multiplication and
addition instructions, (e.g. the vpmaddubs instruction on AVX2), we process pairs of
quadratic terms rather than individual coefficients. This format is chosen to still be con-
venient to handle on platforms that cannot combine multiplications and additions. In par-





for 0 6 i < n do
for 0 6 j < i do
append(terms,u[i] · u[j] mod 31)
end for
end for
r← [0|j = 0..n− 1]
for 0 6 i < n; i← i+ 2 do
for 0 6 j < n do
r[j]← r[j] + u[i] · F[i · n+ 2 · j] mod 31
r[j]← r[j] + u[i+ 1] · F[i · n+ 2 · j + 1] mod 31
end for
end for
for 0 6 i < n·(n+1)
2
; i← i+ 2 do
for 0 6 j < n do
r[j]← r[j] + terms[i] · F[n ·m+ i ·m+ 2 · j] mod 31
r[j]← r[j] + terms[i+ 1] · F[n ·m+ i ·m+ 2 · j + 1] mod 31
end for
end for
Output: r = F(u)
We describe the process in pseudo-code below, see Algorithm 6. Note that this includes
multiplication with elements in F over F31.
To evaluate the polar form function G, we use almost the same procedure. For com-
pleteness, we list it in Algorithm 7. Notably, the differences are limited to a different term





for 0 6 i < n do
for 0 6 j < i do
append(terms,u[i] · v[j] + u[j] · v[i] mod 31)
end for
end for
r← [0|j = 1..n]
for 0 6 i < n·(n+1)
2
; i← i+ 2 do
for 0 6 j < n do
r[j]← r[j] + terms[i] · F[n ·m+ i ·m+ 2 · j] mod 31
r[j]← r[j] + terms[i+ 1] · F[n ·m+ i ·m+ 2 · j + 1] mod 31
end for
end for
Output: r = G(u,v)
9.1.4 Packing and unpacking F31 elements
All field elements included in the signature are stored in packed representation. This
means that, when storing a vector of F31 elements, each element is expressed using five
bits, representing the element using its smallest non-negative representation as an integer.
The first byte of the byte sequence represents the first five bits of the first element, and
the three least-significant bits of the next element. The next byte contains the remaining
two high bits of the second element, the complete third element, and the least-significant
bit of the forth element, etc. Note that for all parameters of MQDSS, we have restricted
the value of n to be a multiple of 8. Thus, there is no need to explicitly specify padding,
since this will result in byte arrays of exact multiples of eight bits. A vector of elements in
F31 is unpacked by applying the inverse of the above operation (see Algorithms 8 and 9).
Algorithm 8 PackArray31(u)
Input: u
bitstring ← [ ], bytearray ← [ ]
for 0 6 i < len(u) do
bitstring ← bitstring||trunc(u[i],5)
end for
for 0 6 i <len(bitstring); i← i+ 8 do





bitstring ← [ ], u← [ ]
for 0 6 i < len(bytearray) do
bitstring ← bitstring||bytearray[i]
end for
for 0 6 i <len(bitstring); i← i+ 5 do





The function PRGρ is instantiated using SHAKE256. See Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10 RhoExpand(Sρ, D)
Input: Sρ, D
block ← SHAKE256(Sρ||D, r · 4k/8)
ρ0 ← subarray(block, 0, r · 2k/8)
ρ1 ← subarray(block, r · 2k/8, r · 4k/8)
Output: ρ0, ρ1
9.1.6 Commitment and hash functions
The commitments Com0 and Com1 and the Hash functions H, H1 and H2 are instantiated
also using SHAKE256. They take as input arrays of F31 elements that need to be in
packed form. The input to the commitment functions Com0 and Com1 is a random string
followed by a sequence of three, respectively two packed byte arrays. The arrays are simply
concatenated bytewise, starting with the vector listed first. The same applies for the hash
functions H, H1 and H2. Their algorithmic description is given in Algorithms 11-15.
It should come as no surprise that the same rejection sampling method is applied to
sample the challenges α(i) ∈ F31. After absorbing the transcript into the SHAKE state, it
is repeatedly squeezed until sufficient elements have been extracted – as before, the least
significant 5 bits are considered as an unsigned integer, and is rejected if it is equal to 31.
The binary challenges are obtained by enumerating the bits of the hash output per
byte, from least to most significant. (see Algorithm 15.)
Algorithm 11 Com0(ρ0, r, t, e)
Input: r, t, e




c0 ← subarray(block, 0, 2k/8)
Output: c0
Algorithm 12 Com1(ρ1, r, e)
Input: r, e


















Algorithm 15 Hash2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1)





for 0 6 i < r do
temp = block[floor(i/8)]
append(ch2, temp[i mod 8])
end for
Output: ch2
9.2 Putting it all together - Pseudo code of KGen,Sign,Vf
Using the defined auxiliary functions from the previous section, we can provide a low
level algorithmic description of the defining algorithms of MQDSS - KGen,Sign,Vf (see
Chapter 7).
For the KGen algorithm of MQDSS, we assume the existence of a function rand() that










An MQDSS signature is generated with the algorithm Sign (see Algorithm 17). It takes
as input a secret key sk and a message to be signed M .
An MQDSS signature is verified using the algorithm Vf (see Algorithm 18). It takes as











ρ0, ρ1 ← RhoExpand(Sρ, D)
r0, t0, e0 ← RTEexpand(Srte, D)
r1 ← [ ], t1 ← [ ], e1 ← [ ]
c0 ← [ ], c1 ← [ ]
com← [ ]
for 0 6 i < r do
append(r1, s− r0[i])
append(c0,Com0(ρ0[i], r0[i], t0[i], e0[i]))





σ1 ← [ ]
for 0 6 i < r do




ch2 ←Hash2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1)
σ2 ← [ ]
for 0 6 i < r do






for 0 6 i < r do






for 0 6 i < r do






Output: σ = R||σ0||σ1||σ2
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Algorithm 18 Vf(pk, σ,M)
Input: pk, σ,M
R←subarray(σ, 0, 2k/8)
σ0 ←subarray(σ, 2k/8, 4k/8)
σ1 ←subarray(σ, 4k/8, (4k + 10nr)/8)
σ2 ←subarray(σ, (4k + 10nr)/8, len(σ))




ch2 ←Hash2(D,σ0, ch1, σ1)
resp1 ←UnpackArray31(σ1)
resp2 ←UnpackArray31(subarray(σ2, 0, 5nr/8))
c←subarray(σ2, 5nr/8, 5nr/8 + 2kr/8)
ρ←subarray(σ2, 5nr/8 + 2kr/8, len(σ2))
com← [ ]
for 0 6 i < r do
t1 ← resp1[2i]
e1 ← resp1[2i+ 1]
if ch2[i] == 0 then
r0 ← resp2[i]
c0 ←Com0(ρ[i], r0, ch1[i] · r0 − t1, ch1[i]·EvaluateF(r0,F)− e1)
c1 ←subarray(c, i · k/8, (i+ 1) · k/8)
else
r1 ← resp2[i]
c1 ←Com1(ρ[i], r1, ch1[i] · (v−EvaluateF(r1,F))−EvaluateG(t1, r1,F)− e1)









10.1 EU-CMA security of MQDSS
The security of MQDSS was proven in [16]. The security reduction is in the random oracle
model and builds on the results obtained for q2 signature schemes (see Appendix A,
Section A.1). For completeness we provide the full proof in Appendix A, Section A.2.
Theorem 10.1. MQDSS is EU-CMA-secure in the random oracle model, if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• the search version of the MQ problem is intractable in the average case,
• the hash functions H, H1, and H2 are modeled as random oracles,
• the commitment functions Com0 and Com1 are computationally binding, computation-
ally hiding, and have O(k) bits of output entropy,
• the function XOFF is modeled as random oracle and
• the pseudorandom generators PRGsk, PRGs, PRGρ and PRGrte have outputs compu-
tationally indistinguishable from random for any polynomial time adversary.
MQDSS instantiates the commitments Com0 and Com1 using cryptographically se-
cure hash function (in particular SHAKE256). The following theorem from [46] shows
that modeling the hash function as a random oracle, we can show that we obtain a com-
putationally hiding commitment. Furthermore, the theorem gives a lower bound on the
randomness that needs to be included as input to the random oracle.
Theorem 10.2. Let k be the security parameter. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a random
oracle. Let ρ ∈ {0, 1}2k be uniformly random. Then the commitment H(ρ,m) is computa-
tionally hiding. In particular, for any two messages M,M ′ the advantage of a polynomial
time (quantum) adversary∣∣Pr [1← A (Com(ρ,M))]− Pr [1← A (Com(ρ,M ′))]∣∣ 6 L(q) · 1/2k.
where L(q) is some linear function of the total number of queries of A.
Recently, Don, Fehr and Majenz [25] proved the QROM security of MQDSS, as an
instantiation of a signature using the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transform. The following
theorem is adapted from [25] (see the paper for details).
Theorem 10.3 (EU-CMA security in the QROM). Under the same conditions as in
Theorem 10.1, where the commitment schemes are instantiated with the standard hash-
based commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function, MQDSS is EU-CMA-secure in
the QROM.
Note that the assumption for a collapsing hash function is actually not an additional as-
sumption, as the hash functions in the QROM are modeled as quantum accessible random
oracles, and a quantum accessible random oracle is collapsing by [58].
10.2 Attacks Against MQDSS
MQDSS has been shown EU-CMA secure both in the ROM and the QROM. Still, to
compromize the security of MQDSS, an adversary could:
• Attack the MQ problem,
• Attack the number of rounds
• Attack the computationally binding property of the commitments
• Attack the computationally hiding property of the commitments
• Attack the hash functions
• Attack the pseudo-random generators
Since the commitment functions, the hash functions and the pseudo-random generators
are all instantiated using SHAKE256, all the attacks apart from the first two boil down
to attacking SHAKE256.
One could compromise the security of MQDSS if one breaks the preimage resistance
(this will break the hiding property of the commitments), the collision resistance (this will
break the binding property of the commitments) or if one finds properties that distinguish
the output of SHAKE256 from random. A substantial amount of research has been devoted
to the security of SHAKE and the SHA3 standard. The public scrutiny gives confidence
in its security, however the details are out of the scope of this document. We refer the
interested reader to [49, 11].
This leaves attacks against the MQ problem as the point of interest. Since the public
key is randomly generated (from a random seed by expanding the seed), the obtained
system can be considered as semiregular, i.e. we can be confident that there are no hid-
den structural weaknesses. This means that the generic algebraic methods are the best
algorithms against the MQ instance in MQDSS and therefore against the system. For
details see 2. Based on these conclusions, the security of the proposed parameter sets can
be estimated as in Table 8.2. Additional parameters security estimate is given in Table 8.4,
and scaled-down parameters estimate in Table 13.3.
Recently, Kales and Zaverucha [39] published an attack on MQDSS that exploits how
the number of rounds r had been chosen. In particular, in Version 2.0 the number of rounds






which ensures a soundness error of r parallel repetions
of the 5-pass IDS smaller than 1/2k. While this seeme like a very reasonable choice, it
does not follow as a corollary from the security reduction. As the attack [39] showed, this
choice does not provide 2k security of the proposed parameters. The current Version 2.1
specifically aims at adjusting the parameters to counter this attack. See Chapter 8 for
details. Please refer to [39] for details of the attack.
We emphasize that the attack is an artefact of the non-tightness of the security re-





In this chapter we discuss all relevant design choices that we made and provide appropriate
justification for these choices.
11.1 Parameters
In choosing appropriate parameters for MQDSS, the most important criteria was of course
the level of security these parameters provide. In the previous chapters we provided a
complete security analysis of MQDSS. We
• proved the security of MQDSS in the random oracle model (cf. Section 10.1),
• analyzed the practical security of the MQ problem by investigating the state of the
art classical and quantum algorithms for solving it (c.f. Section 2.2 and Section 2.3),
and
• used known results about the security of the extendable output function SHAKE256,
which we used to instantiate the commitments, the pseudo-random generators and
hash functions.
Since our security reduction in the ROM is very loose, we found it impractical to use con-
crete expressions from the reduction in our choice of parameters. Instead, the parameters
are based on the best known attacks against the MQ problem and against SHAKE256.
In particular,
• We choose the number of variables and equations in F to be the same i.e m = n, as
this gives effectively the hardest instances of the MQ problem.
• Using the analysis from Section 2.2, we estimate the lower bound of the number of
variables n′ in order for the resulting MQ instance to satisfy a particular security
level/category (as defined in [50]) in terms of classical field operations of the best
classical attacks,
• Using the analysis from Section 2.3, we estimate the lower bound of the number of
variables n′′ in order for the resulting MQ instance to satisfy a particular security
level/category (as defined in [50]) in terms of quantum circuit size and depth of the
best quantum attacks,
• The number of variables n is then chosen as n = max{n′, n′′}.
• We choose the parameter k such that the output of the hash functions H, H1, H2 is
large enough to satisfy collision resistance security of the level specified by Categories
2,4 and 6.
• We chose the parameter ρ denoting the input randomness to the commitment functions
to be ρ = 2k based on the results from [46] (See Theorem 10.2)1.
• Finally, the number of rounds r is chosen such that the Kales Zaverucha attack [39]
has complexity 2k (for details see Chapter 8).
11.2 5-pass over 3-pass SSH Identification Scheme
In [44], Sakumoto, Shirai and Hiwatari propose also a 3-pass scheme whose security also
provably relies on the MQ problem and is defined solely over F2. One could argue that
this one is a much more natural choice. Indeed, it is a 3-pass scheme, so one can directly
apply the Fiat-Shamir transform that has been scrutinized for decades by the community.
In addition it is defined over the Boolean domain, so implementation is particularly easy.
Version 1.0-2.0 of MQDSS was designed using the 5-pass SSH scheme for a very simple
reason - signature size. Until the attack of Kales and Zaverucha [39], the superiority was
quite clear.
For example, the 3-pass SSH scheme which has a soundness error of 2/3 would require
219 rounds for security categories 1-2, which is much larger than 135 - the number of
rounds in MQDSS-31-48 (Security categories 1-2). Further, for Categories 1-2, the number
of variables in the MQ system would need to be at least n = 160, which amounts to a
signature of size 4k + r(3n + 4k) = 27220 bytes (see [16] for derivation of this formula)
which is more than 6.2KiB larger than Version 2.0 MQDSS-31-48. For Categories 3-4 the
difference compared to Version 2.0 MQDSS-31-64 is even larger - almost 15.2KiB, since
we now need at least r = 329 and n = 224 which gives a signature of size 59316 bytes.
After the changes made as a result of [39], unfortunately the previous advantage has
dissapeared. Now, th signature sizes of Version 2.1 of MQDSS and the signatures from the
3-pass SSH are almost the same with slight advantage of the 3-pass.
11.3 Optimizations
In the definition of MQDSS (see Chapter 7) we have used an optimization proposed already
in [44]: It is not necessary to include all 2r commitments in the transcript. Instead, we in-
clude a digest over the concatenation of all commitments σ0 = H(com(1)||com(2)|| . . . ||com(r))




1−b(2) , . . . , c
(r)
1−b(r) that the verifier can not recompute.
This optimization saves 4kr − 2k bits from the final signature which is almost 11.5KiB
for MQDSS-31-48 and almost 26KiB for MQDSS-31-64. This modification does not cause
any problems, since we have shown (c.f.Chapter 10) that it does not disturb the security
arguments.
11.4 Other Functions
In order to instantiate the commitment functions, pseudorandom generators and extend-
able output function, we rely on SHAKE-256, as standardized in FIPS 202, the SHA-3
1 In Version 1, we wrongfully assumed that the randomness of the other inputs to the commitment is
enough to provide the computationally hiding property, and used ρ = 0. This mistake is corrected in
this version, although, unfortunately it results in some overhead in the signature size.
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standard. This gives us a sufficiently large security margin that its preimage and second
preimage resistance is not relevant for the overall security level. In general, this means
that we simply concatenate the defined inputs as byte arrays, and absorb them into the





12.1 Performance on Intel x64-86
In order to obtain benchmarks, we evaluate our reference implementation on a machine
using the Intel x64-86 instruction set. In particular, we use a single core of a 3.5 GHz Intel
Core i7-4770K CPU. We follow the standard practice of disabling TurboBoost and hyper-
threading. The system has 32 KiB L1 instruction cache, 32 KiB L1 data cache, 256 KiB L2
cache and 8192 KiB L3 cache. Furthermore, it has 32GiB of RAM, running at 1333 MHz.
When performing the benchmarks, the system ran on Linux kernel 4.9.0-6-amd64, Debian
10 (Buster).
We compiled the code using GCC version 8.3.0-6, with the compiler optimization flag
-O3. The median resulting cycle counts are listed in the table below.
keygen signing verification
MQDSS-31-48 1 141 862 36 554 776 26 639 058
MQDSS-31-64 2 670 612 116 772 480 84 685 222
12.2 Performance on Intel x64-86 AVX2
Since the evaluation of the MQ function is the most costly part of the computation but also
benefits greatly from parallelism, we thought it useful to also provide benchmarks when
the scheme is implemented using AVX2 instructions. We used the same system described
above to obtain the following measurements, this time including the -mavx2 compiler flag.
keygen signing verification
MQDSS-31-48 1 035 498 5 466 490 3 563 610
MQDSS-31-64 2 406 494 14 355 450 9 806 182
12.3 Size
As the private key is merely a seed that is used to generate the required secret material,
this is 16 respectively 24 bytes for the given parameter sets. The public key contains a
public seed, but also F(s), making it 46 and 64 bytes respectively.
The stack space consumption is largely determined by the size of the signature and the
expanded version of F. A straight-forward implementation constructs the transcript in
memory before evaluating the hash function that determines the challenges. More memory-
conservative implementations could keep an intermediate hash function state, instead, and
stream through the transcript as it is constructed.
The expanded version of F requires some active memory. Naively, it benefits from hav-
ing 57 KiB or 100 KiB (for the different parameter sets, respectively) of active memory
available. More memory-constrained implementations could reschedule the different com-
putations in a way that F only needs to be parsed once, however, and can thus also make
use of a streaming API.
For the given parameter sets, the signature size is respectively 28400 and 59928 bytes
(i.e. 27.7 KiB and 58.5 KiB). Since the signature primarily consists of transcripts of rounds
of the non-interactive identification protocol, it scales linearly in the number of rounds and




MQDSS depends on four parameters q, k, n, r. The first parameter q determines the un-
derlying field, and changing it has mostly to do with performance, since all the arithmetic
operations are performed using different types of instructions which may influence speed
for example. In some cases, the choice of q may introduce different dedicated attacks for
the particular field, as in the case of q = 2, which may have slightly better performance
(see Chapter 2 for detailed analysis of the known algorithms against the MQ problem).
For a fixed value of q by increasing or decreasing the parameters k and n we increase or
decrease the resistance of the system against known attacks. The number of rounds r can
be freely tuned, but we choose it such hat the best known attack [39] has complexity 2k.
Based on the NIST call document [50], in a similar fashion to the 6 provided security
categories, we identify 4 down-scaled categories
• BLOCKCIPHER64 (Category 0.1) - the security level of a generic block cipher with
64 bit key.
• HASHFUNCTION128 (Category 0.2) - the security level of a generic hash function
with 128 bit output.
• BLOCKCIPHER96 (Category 0.3) - the security level of a generic block cipher with
96 bit key.
• HASHFUNCTION192 (Category 0.4) - the security level of a generic hash function
with 192 bit output.
Our estimate of the concrete security level these provide in terms of classical and
quantum gates, assuming black box treatment of the primitives (i.e. the best attacks are








0.1 BLOCKCIPHER64 274 250 246
0.2 HASHFUNCTION128 277
0.3 BLOCKCIPHER96 2108 266 262
0.4 HASHFUNCTION192 2110
Table 13.1: Basic characteristics of the scaled down parameter sets











0.1-0.2 64 4 48 95 20 8 10640
0.1-0.2 64 16 32 71 24 8 8112
0.1-0.2 64 31 24 68 23 8 7039
0.1-0.2 64 32 24 67 23 8 7039
0.1-0.2 64 64 24 66 26 8 7342
0.3-0.4 96 4 64 142 28 12 22704
0.3-0.4 96 16 40 106 32 12 16464
0.3-0.4 96 31 40 101 37 12 17022
0.3-0.4 96 32 40 101 37 12 16899
0.3-0.4 96 64 32 99 36 12 15408
Table 13.2: Basic characteristics of the scaled down parameter sets
Security
category
Best classical attack Best quantum attack
q n algorithm Gates algorithm Gates Depth
0.1-0.2 4 48 Crossbread 284 Crossbread 257 248
0.1-0.2 16 32 Crossbread 287 Crossbread 259 251
0.1-0.2 31 24 Crossbread 283 Crossbread 259 250
0.1-0.2 32 24 Crossbread 284 Crossbread 253 245
0.1-0.2 64 24 HybridF5 294 Crossbread 260 252
0.3-0.4 4 64 Crossbread 2109 Crossbread 271 262
0.3-0.4 16 40 Crossbread 2112 Crossbread 272 263
0.3-0.4 31 40 Crossbread 2135 Crossbread 286 276
0.3-0.4 32 40 Crossbread 2136 Crossbread 283 273
0.3-0.4 64 32 HybridF5 2120 Crossbread 273 264
Table 13.3: Best classical and quantum attacks against the scaled down parameter sets
Since the signature size of MQDSS is the most critical performance characteristic,
it is natural to consider it over other characteristics when estimating the security vs.
performance trade-off. For better visual judgment, we have plotted this trade-off for q = 31,
which is the chosen value of our reference parameter sets (see Section 8.1).






























For any cryptographic design, the final product is a result based on decisions made to
satisfy a certain security level, while maintaining desired properties such as performance
and usability. This trade-off necessarily introduces weaknesses, but the designers’ goal is
to preserve enough good features to make the schemes attractive.
MQDSS is not an exception. In this chapter, we summarize and discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of our proposal.
Strengths of MQDSS:
• Small keys. MQDSS has extremely small keys, comparable to contemporary schemes
such as ECDSA that provide only classical security. On the other hand, they are several
orders of magnitudes smaller than the keys of other MQ schemes.
• Provably secure MQ signature, with reduction from the MQ problem. MQDSS is the
first multivariate signature scheme that is provably secure, and whose security relies
solely on the MQ problem. The security has been proven both in the ROM [16] and
the QROM [25].
• Flexible parameters. All four parameters q, n, k, r can be easily tuned to match different
security levels and platforms. Even more the number of variables is independent of the
number of rounds, so in case of improvement in algebraic attacks against the MQ
problem only the number of variable could be changed.
• Simple design. The underlying IDS uses a simple splitting technique based on the
bilinearity of the polar form. The rest is a slightly more general Fiat-Shamir transform
to turn the interactive protocol into a signature. The design does not utilize complicated
algebraic structures (possibly even mathematically poorly understood), there is no
dependence on possibly vulnerable distribution samplers, and in general there is very
little room for flawed deployment.
• Suitable for hardware implementation. Due to the flexible parameters, it is possible to
define MQDSS over fields of characteristic 2, such as F16 that are especially suitable
for hardware implementation.
• Naturally parallelizable. The computations within a round are independent of the other
rounds so it is straightforward to perform in parallel all rounds.
• Inherently constant-time. The straight-forward way of implementing the scheme is
inherently protected against timing attacks. Evaluating the MQ function can tradi-
tionally be done in ways that depend on the input, but this is typically an additional
optimization effort. Moreover, our chosen parameter set makes this unattractive on
most platforms.
Weaknesses of MQDSS:
• Large signature size. Probably the biggest weakness of MQDSS is its signature size.
Compared to traditional signature schemes the signature is at least 100 times larger.
The same is true for other multivariate schemes. However, traditional MQ schemes
have ad-hoc designs, without proof of security. Even more, in a typical usage scenario
of signatures such as PKI, what matters is actually the size of the public key plus the
signature. In such a setting MQDSS is still better, beating traditionalMQ schemes by
a factor of 2-20 depending on the scheme. On the other hand, provably secure schemes
that provide post-quantum security tend to have much larger signatures, and for the
schemes we are aware, the signatures are in the same range as MQDSS.
• Security proof not tight. Another weakness of our security proof is that is not at all
tight. This is again an inherent weakness introduced by the rewinding technique of the
forking lemma. Therefore, in order to produce a tight security reduction for MQDSS
one would have to base the proof on different techniques. At the moment, we are not
aware of such techniques that we could use.
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AVX2 Implementation of MQDSS
To demonstrate performance, we have also implemented the scheme using AVX2 vec-
tor instructions. As mentioned above, this makes convenient use of the structure of the
terms, allowing implementations to benefit from the vpmaddubs instruction to combine
two multiplications with an addition. In one instruction, this computes two 8 bit SIMD
multiplications and a 16 bit SIMD addition. This also underlines the benefit of details such
as elements in F in signed representation, since this allows accumulating more additions
in vectorized 16-bit words before performing a reduction.
When arranging reductions, we must strike a careful balance between preventing over-
flow and not reducing more often than necessary. As we make extensive use of vpmaddubsw,
which takes both a signed and an unsigned operand to compute the quadratic monomials,
we ensure that the input variables for theMQ function are unsigned values (in particular:
{0, . . . , 31}). For the coefficients in the system parameter F, we can then freely assume the
values are in {−15, . . . , 15}, as these are the direct result of a pseudo-random generator.
It turns out to be efficient to immediately reduce the quadratic monomials back to
{0, . . . , 31} when they are computed. When we now multiply such a product with an
element from the system parameter and add it to the accumulators, the maximum value
of each accumulator word will be at most1 64 · 31 · 15 = 29760. As this does not exceed
the maximum value of 32768, we only have to perform reductions on each individual
accumulator at the very end.
For the smaller parameter set, i.e. n = 48, these constraints are less pressing, but the
maximum value accumulators remains in the same ballpark. Both n = 48 and n = 64
benefit from the fact that these parameters are multiples of 16, which results in a very
similar optimal implementation strategy and convenient code reuse.
1 This follows from the fact that we combine 64 such monomials in two YMM registers.
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A.1 Security of q2-signature schemes.
For completeness of this document, we provide in full the security reduction for Construc-
tion 5.1 in the random oracle model, and the proof of EU-CMA security of the obtained
signature scheme.
To prove this claim, we proceed in several steps. The proof builds on techniques in-
troduced by Pointcheval and Stern [53] (see Section 4.2 for a brief description of the
technique). As the reduction is far from being tight, we refrain from doing an exact proof
as it does not gain us anything but a complicated statement. We first recall an important
tool from [53] called the splitting lemma.
Lemma A.1 (Splitting lemma [53]). Let A ⊂ X × Y , such that
Pr[A(x, y)] > ε. Then, there exists Ω ⊂ X, such that
Pr[x ∈ Ω] > ε/2,
Pr[A(a, y)|a ∈ Ω] > ε/2.
We next present a forking lemma for q2-signature schemes. The lemma shows that
we can obtain four valid signatures which contain four valid transcripts of the underlying
IDS, given a successful key-only adversary. Moreover, these four transcripts fulfill a certain
requirement on the challenges (here the related parts of the hash function outputs) that
we need later.
In the lemma and in the rest of the chapter, we model the functions H1 and H2 as
independent random oracles O1 and O2. Furthermore, for ease of exposition in our proofs,
we use a “full” version of a signature, including the outputs h1 and h2 of H1 and H2, i.e.,
instead of σ = (σ0, σ1, σ2), we assume a signature has the form σ = (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2).
(Note that h1 and h2 need not be included in the signatures because they can be easily
reconstructed from the other values.)
Lemma A.2 (Forking lemma for q2-signature schemes). Let Dss(1k) be a q2-
signature scheme with security parameter k ∈ N. If there exists a PPT adversary A that
can output a valid signature message pair (M,σ) with non-negligible success probability,
given only the public key as input, then, with non-negligible probability, rewinding A a
polynomial number of times with the same random tape but different oracles, outputs 4
valid message signature pairs (M,σ = (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2)), (M,σ
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Proof. To prove the Lemma we need to show that we can rewind A three times (and
adaptability program the random oracles) and at the same time, the probability that A
succeeds in forging a (different) signature in all four runs is non-negligible. Moreover, we
have to show that the signatures have the additional property claimed in the Lemma,
again with non-negligible probability.
Let ω ∈ Rw be A’s random tape with Rw the set of allowable random tapes. During
the attack A may ask polynomially many queries (in the security parameter k) Q1(k) and
Q2(k) to the random oracles O1 and O2. Let q1,1, q1,2, . . . , q1,Q1 and q2,1, q2,2, . . . , q2,Q2
be the queries to O1 and O2, respectively. Moreover, let (r1,1, r1,2, . . . , r1,Q1) ∈ (Cr1)Q1 and
(r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,Q2) ∈ (Cr2)Q2 the corresponding answers of the oracles.
Denote by F the event that A outputs a valid message signature pair (M,σ =
(σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2)). Per assumption, this event occurs with non-negligible probability, i.e.,
Pr[F] = 1P (k) , for some polynomial P (k). In addition, F implies h1 = O1(M,σ0) and
h2 = O2(M,σ0, h1, σ1). As h1, h2 are chosen uniformly at random from exponentially
large sets Cr1,C
r
2, the probability that A did not query O1 with (M,σ0) and O2 with
(M,σ0, h1, σ1) is negligible. Hence, there exists a polynomial P
′ such that the event F′





For the moment consider only the second oracle. From the previous equation, there
exists at least one β 6 Q2 such that
Pr[F′ ∧ q2,β = (M,σ0, h1, σ1)] >
1
Q2(k)P ′(k)
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and all answers from O2, i.e. over
the set B = {(ω, r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,Q2)|ω ∈ Rw ∧ (r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,Q2) ∈ (Cr2)Q2 ∧ F′ ∧ q2,β =
(M,σ0, h1, σ1)}.
(Informally, the following steps just show that the success of an algorithm with non-
negligible success probability cannot be conditioned on an event that occurs only with
negligible probability (i.e. the outcome of the q2,β query landing in some negligible subset).)
The last equation implies that there exists a non-negligible set of “good” random tapes
Ωβ ⊆ Rω for which A can provide a valid signature and q2,β is the oracle query determining
h2. Applying the splitting lemma, we get that
Pr[w ∈ Ωβ] >
1
2Q2(k)P ′(k)
Pr[(ω, r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,Q2) ∈ B|w ∈ Ωβ] >
1
2Q2(k)P ′(k)
Applying the same reasoning again we can derive from the later probability being non-
negligible that there exists a non-negligible subset Ωβ,ω of the “good” oracle responses
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(r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,β−1) such that (ω, r2,1, r2,2, . . . , r2,Q2) ∈ B. Applying the splitting lemma
again, we get
Pr[(r2,1, . . . , r2,β−1) ∈ Ωβ,ω] >
1
4Q2(k)P ′(k)
Pr[(ω, r2,1, . . . , r2,Q2) ∈ B|(r2,1, . . . , r2,β−1) ∈ Ωβ,ω)] >
1
4Q2(k)P ′(k)
This means that rewinding A to the point where it made query q2,β and running it with
new, random r′2,β, . . . , r
′
2,Q2
has a non-negligible probability of A outputting another valid
signature. Therefore, we can use A to find with non-negligible probability two valid mes-
sage signature pairs (M,σ = (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2)), (M,σ













1). and h2 6= h′2.
We now rewind the adversary again using exactly the same technique as above but now
considering the queries to O1 and its responses. In the replay we change the responses of
O1 to obtain a third signature that differs from the previously obtained ones in the first
associated hash value. In the same manner, it can be shown that with non-negligible
probability A will output a third signature on M , σ′′ = (σ0, h′′1, σ′′1 , h′′2, σ′′2), such that
h′′1 6= h′1 = h1.
Finally, we rewind the adversary a third time, keeping the responses of O1 from the last
rewind and focusing on O2 again. Again, with non-negligible probability A will produce yet

















and h′′2 6= h′′′2 .
Summing up , rewinding the adversary three times, we can find four valid signatures
σ, σ′, σ′′, σ′′′ with non-negligible success probability
1
P (k)
for some polynomial P (k). Let





What remains is to show that the obtained signatures satisfy the particular structure from
the lemma (Equation A.1) with non-negligible probability.
Let H be the event that for (σ, σ′, σ′′.σ′′′) there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that (A.1)
is satisfied. For the probability that A outputs a valid signature with this property, we
have that
Pr[Eσ ∧H] = Pr[Eσ]− Pr[¬H ∧ Eσ] >
1
P (k)
− Pr[¬H ∧ Eσ]
Now, let σ, σ′, σ′′, σ′′′ be the four valid signatures that A outputs under the event
¬H ∧ Eσ. This means that (A.1) is not satisfied for σ, σ′, σ′′, σ′′′ for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
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2 ) in A’s output under the event
¬H ∧ Eσ must be in S¬H. Indeed if the hash value tuple does not come from S¬H, then
there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, such that none of i., ii., iii., holds true, i.e., for this j
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(ch1)
(j) 6= (ch′1)(j) ∧ (ch2)(j) 6= (ch′2)(j) ∧ (ch′′2)(j) 6= (ch′′′2 )(j).
A little thought reveals that the last is equivalent to (A.1), which is a contradiction to the
assumption that the tuple comes under the event ¬H ∧ Eσ.
Recall that for q2 -signatures, C1 has size q and C2 size 2. Now, the cardinality of S¬H
can be calculated to be |S¬H| = (4q(3q + 1))r, whereas the cardinality of (Cr1)2 × (Cr2)4 is
(16q2)r. This means that









which is negligible in k since according to Construction 5.1, the number of rounds r must
be super-logarithmic (in k), to fulfill Cr2 being exponentially large (in k).
Finally,












and hence, the conditions from the lemma are satisfied with non-negligible probability. ut
With Lemma A.2 we can already establish unforgeability under key only attacks:
Theorem A.3 (KOA security of q2-signature schemes). Let k ∈ N, IDS(1k) a q2-
IDS that has a key relation R, is KOW secure, and has a q2-extractor. Then q2 -Dss(1k),
the q2-signature scheme derived applying Construction 5.1 is unforgeable under key-only
attacks.
Proof. Let A be a PPT algorithm that forges a signature in a KOA setting, i.e., given
only the public key pk outputs a valid message-signature pair (M,σ) with non-negligible
probability ε. We show how to construct an algorithmMA that given IDS public key and
oracle access to A breaks the KOW security of IDS in essentially the same running time
as the given A and with negligibly different success probability.
On input the IDS public key pk, MA runs A(pk) which outputs a valid message-
signature pair (M,σ) for q2 -Dss. Using the technique from Lemma A.2, rewinding A,
MA obtains four valid signatures that with overwhelming probability contain four valid
transcripts that satisfy Equation (A.1). These are exactly the type of transcripts needed
for the q2-extractor to extract a valid secret key sk’. Since (pk, sk′) ∈ R, MA breaks the
KOW security of IDS. ut
For EU-CMA security, we still have to deal with signature queries. The following lemma
shows that a reduction can produce valid responses to the adversarial signature queries if
the identification scheme is computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
Lemma A.4. Let k ∈ N the security parameter, IDS(1k) a q2-IDS that is honest-verifier
zero-knowledge. Then any PPT adversary B against the EU-CMA-security of q2 -Dss(1k),
the q2-signature scheme derived by applying Construction 5.1, can be turned into a key-
only adversary A against q2 -Dss with the properties described in Lemma A.2. A runs in
polynomial time and succeeds with essentially the same success probability as B.
Proof. By construction. We show how to construct an oracle machine AB,S,O1,O2 that has
access to B, a computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator S, and random
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oraclesO1,O2.A produces a valid signature for q2 -Dss(1k) given only a public key running
in time polynomial in k and achieving essentially the same success probability (up to a
negligible difference) as B.
Upon input of public key pk, A runs BO′1,O′2,Sign(pk) simulating the random oracles
(ROs) O′1,O′2, as well as the signing oracle Sign towards B. When B outputs a forgery
(M∗, σ∗), A just forwards it.
To simulate the ROs, A keeps two initially empty tables of query-response pairs, one
per oracle. Whenever B queries O′b, A first checks if the table for O′b already contains a
pair for this query. If such a pair exists, A just returns the stored response. Otherwise, A
forwards the query to its own Ob.
As IDS is computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge there exists a PPT simulator
S that upon input of a IDS public key generates a valid transcript which only negligibly
reduced the success probability of an adversary compared to transcripts generated by
honest protocol executions. Whenever B queries the signature oracle with message m,
A runs S r times, to obtain r valid transcripts. A combines the transcripts to obtain a
valid signature σ = (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2). Before outputting σ, A checks if the table for O′1
already contains an entry for query (M,σ0). If so, A aborts. Otherwise, A adds the pair
((M,σ0), h1). Then, A checks the second table for query (M,σ0, h1, σ1). Again, A aborts
if it finds such an entry and adds ((M,σ0, h1, σ1), h2), otherwise.
The probability that A aborts is negligible in k. When answering signature queries, A
verifies that certain queries were not made before. Both queries contain σ1 which takes
any given value only with negligible probability. On the other hand, the total number of
queries that B makes to all its oracles is polynomially bounded. Hence, the probability
that one of the two queries was already made before is negligible. If A does not abort, it
perfectly simulates the random oracles towards B. Because of the computationally HVZK,
there is only a negligible difference in the success probability of B – and thereby A –
compared to the real EU-CMA game in this case. Hence, A succeeds with essentially the
same probability as B. ut
We now got everything we need to prove EU-CMA security. The proof is a straight
forward application of Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.4.
Theorem A.5 (EU-CMA security of q2-signature schemes). Let k ∈ N, IDS(1k)
a q2-IDS that has a key relation R, is KOW secure, is computationally honest-verifier
zero-knowledge, and has a q2-extractor E. Then q2 -Dss(1k), the q2-signature scheme de-
rived applying Construction 5.1 is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message
attacks.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a PPT adversary A against the
EU-CMA-security of q2 -Dss succeeding with non-negligible probability. We show how to
construct a PPT algorithm MA that given the IDS public key and oracle access to A
breaks the KOW security of IDS. Applying Lemma A.4, MA can construct a PPT key-
only forger B, with essentially the same success probability as A. Given a public key for
IDS (which is a valid q2 -Dss public key) MA runs B as described in Lemma A.2. That
way MA can use B to obtain four signatures that per (A.1) lead to four transcripts as
required by the q2-extractor E . Running E , MA can extract a valid secret key sk′ that
breaks the KOW security of IDS.
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MA just runs B and E , two PPT algorithms. Consequently, MA runs in polynomial
time. Also, B and E both have non-negligible success probability implying that MA also
succeeds with non-negligible probability. ut
A.2 Proof of Theorem 10.1 [EU-CMA security of MQDSS]
Before we present the proof, note that as our results from Section A.1 are non-tight we
only prove an asymptotic statement. While this does not suffice to make any statement
about the security of a specific parameter choice, it provides evidence that the general
approach leads to a secure scheme.
To prove this theorem we would like to apply Theorem 5.2 (the same as Theorem A.5).
However, Theorem 5.2 was formulated for a slightly more generic construction (see Con-
struction 5.1). The point is that we apply an optimization originally proposed in [54].
So, in our actual proposal (see Chapter 7), the parallel composition of the IDS is slightly
different as, instead of the commitments, only the hash of their concatenation is sent (c.f.
σ0 in Figure 7.2). Also, the last message (c.f. σ2 in Figure 7.2) now contains the remaining
commitments. Let’s call this optimized version opt - q2 -Dss(1k).
Note that since MQDSS is an opt - q2 -Dss(1k) signature scheme, we could have focused
our attention solely to opt - q2 -Dss(1k) schemes already in Chapter 5. However, this would
have limited the general applicability of the result, as the above optimization is only
applicable to schemes with a certain, less generic, structure such as MQDSS.
As the next Corollary shows, it is easy to verify that the results from Chapter 5 hold
for the optimized opt - q2 -Dss(1k) scheme as well.
Corollary A.6 (EU-CMA security of q2-signature schemes). Let k ∈ N, IDS(1k) a
q2-IDS that has a key relation R, is KOW secure, is computationally honest-verifier zero-
knowledge, and has a q2-extractor E. Then opt - q2 -Dss(1k), the optimized q2-signature
scheme derived by applying Construction 5.1 and the optimization explained above, is
existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. Regarding Lemma A.2, note that by removing duplicate information from the signa-
ture, we do not affect the ability to extract in any way, and thus the probability of success of
the adversary remains exactly the same. Thus Lemma A.2 also holds for opt - q2 -Dss(1k).
For Lemma A.4, the arguments are exactly the same with the exception that the
probability of abort of A may now be different, but nevertheless, still negligible. Indeed,
the proof of Lemma A.4 uses the fact that the first signature element σ1 only takes a given
value with negligible probability. This follows from the fact that the commitment scheme
has big enough output entropy – and thereby also takes a given value with negligible
probability. In the case of opt - q2 -Dss(1k), this statement follows from the same property
of the commitment scheme but also from the randomness of the RO that we used to model
the hash functionH. Hence, the proof of Lemma A.4 also goes through for opt - q2 -Dss(1k).
Now, the rest of the proof proceeds exactly the same as in Theorem 5.2. ut
Based on this corollary we can now prove Theorem 10.1.
Proof (of Theorem 10.1). Towards a contradiction, assume there exists an adversary A
that wins the EU-CMA game against MQDSS with non-negligible success probability.
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We show that this implies the existence of an oracle machine MA that solves the MQ
problem, breaks a property of one of the commitment schemes, or distinguishes the outputs
of one of the pseudorandom generators from random. We first define a series of games and
argue that the difference in success probability of A between these games is negligible. We
assume that M runs A in these games.
Game 0: Is the EU-CMA game for MQDSS.
Game 1: Is Game 0 with the difference thatM replaces the outputs of PRGrte by random
bit strings.
Game 2: Is Game 1 with the difference thatM replaces the outputs of PRGsk by random
bit strings.
Game 3: Is Game 2 with the difference that M replaces the outputs of PRGs by random
bit strings.
Game 4: Is Game 3 with the difference that M replaces the outputs of PRGρ by random
bit strings.
Game 5: Is Game 4 with the difference that M takes as additional input a random equa-
tion system F.M simulates XOFF towardsA, programming XOFF such that it returns
the coefficients representing F upon input of SF and uniformly random values on any
other input.
Per assumption, A wins Game 0 with non-negligible success probability. Let’s call this
ε. If the difference in A’s success probability playing Game 0 or Game 1 was non-negligible,
we could use A to distinguish the outputs of PRGrte from random. The same argument
applies for the difference between Game 1 and Game 2, between Game 2 and Game 3 and
between Game 3 and Game 4. Finally, the output distribution of XOFF in Game 5 is the
same as in previous games. Hence, there is no difference for A between Game 4 and Game
5. Accordingly, A’s success probability in these two games is equal.
Now, Game 5 is exactly the EU-CMA game for the optimized opt - q2 signature scheme
that is derived from MQ - IDS, the 5-pass IDS from [44].
Next, recall that under the assumption of intractability of the MQ problem on av-
erage and assuming computationally binding and computationally hiding properties of
Com0 and Com1, MQ - IDS is KOW (c.f. Theorem 3.1), is computationally HVZK (c.f.
Theorem 4) and has a q2-extractor (c.f. Theorem 7). We can now apply Corollary A.6
on MQ - IDS, and obtain that the opt - q2 signature scheme derived from MQ - IDS is
EU-CMA secure. This is a contradiction to the assumption that A wins Game 5 with
non-negligible probability. ut
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